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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is practically an axiom now that when the United States 
entered upon nationhood unity was far from complete. The bond 
holding the states together was the Constitution. But some in-
terpreted this strictly, maintaining the doctrines of states' 
rights even to the extent of nullification of federal laws and 
even to the right to secede from the union. Others favored a 
liberal interpretation as to the federal powers granted by the 
constitution. The question of the interpretation of the consti 
tution and definition of the rights of States was constantly 
debated and many bitter debates were ultimately settled by com-
promise. 
The mere introduction of any bill into the halls of Con-
gress until 1860 called for a debate upon its constitutionality 
and thereupon broug~t forth speeches for the federal authority 
and against it. The extension of slavery is a well known 
source of debate. So too was the question of the tariff, 
revenues, and taxation. The slavery and tariff issues indi-
cated the great division of the states into North and South. 
In the matter of tariff the South, being chiefly agricultural, 
generally opposed protective measures and fought high tariffs, 
1 
2 
while the North, having a variety of manufacturing and industr~ 
al pursuits, wished American industry protected against the 
products of cheap foreign labor. The Civil War settled the 
questions of slavery and secession. It settled also the ques-
tion of the right of the federal government to establish 
tariffs. Nevertheless, until 1868, the tariff question has 
played an important part in the national political scene. 
The Republicans, in the campaign of 1868, committed them-
selves to the reduction of taxation, a policy which was already 
under way. Just before the end of the Civil War, a special 
commission had been authorized by Congress to study how new 
revenue might be obtained, but the war was over by the time the 
appointments were made. The commission, therefore, turned its 
attention to the problem of how the tax burden might be reduce~ 
and so impressed the Secretary of the Treasury with its dili-
gence, that when the commission's term had expired, he kept on 
its able chief, David A. Wells, as 11 special commissioner of the 
revenue • 111 Both the .commission and the special comm1 ssioner 
advised the gradual reduction of tariffs and excises, and on 
the subject of excises, Congress responded readily. Many of 
the war taxes were still in force when Ulysses S. Grant became 
President. In July, 1870, an act was passed which eliminated 
1John D. Hicks, The American Nation, Houghton-Mifflin, New 
York, 1941, 46. · Hereafter this work will be cited as Hicks, 
American Nation. 
3 
most of the nuisance taxes, restricted the internal revenues 
to a small number of articles such as liquor and tobacco. It 
also reduced the income tax, which two years later, was abol-
ished. 
For a long time efforts to lower the tariff met with suc-
cessful opposition from those who profited from the high rates, 
and during Johnson's term Congress was actually persuaded to 
raise the duties on raw wool, woolen goode, copper, and copper 
ore. 2 Not until 1872 were the first real reductions made. At 
that time many non-protective duties, such as those on tea, 
coffee, spices, and various raw materials, were lowered or abol-
iehed, and a 10% cut was reluctantly conceded for a few care-
fully chosen duties on manufactured articles. 
Many changes were made in the tariff laws from 1875 to 
1880. On February 8, 1875 the rates on some duties increased, 
and others were reduced.3 On March 3, 1875, the rates on sugar 
were increased, the 10% reduction of the Act of 1872 was re-
peaied, and the internal revenue taxes on tobacco and liquor 
were repealed.4 Another attempt on the part of the Democratic 
2Ibid. 
3George B. Curtiss, The Industrial Development of Nations, Vol-
ume III, Curtiss, Binghamton, New York, 1912, 31. Hereafter 
this work will be cited as Curtiss, Industrial Development. 
4Ibid. Also David s. Muzzey, The American Adventure, Volume II, 
Harpers, New York, 1927, 71. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Muzzey, American Adventure. 
4 
party to overthrow the policy of protection came in 1876. This 
was a resolution introduced by William Morrison of Illinois, 
Chairman of the Democratic Ways and Means Committee, which pro-
vided for a horizontal reduction in duties.5 The attack on our 
industries was renewed in the session of 1878, by a bill intro-
duced by Fernando Woods of New York City, who especially repre-
sented the importing interests.6 The bill was an entering 
wedge for the complete overthrow of protection then contem-
plated by the Democratic party. On December 1, 1877, Roger Q. 
11.Ulls of Texas offered a resolution 'tto so revise the tariff as 
to make it purely and solely a tariff for revenue,u and not for 
protection.'7 
The above facts are adverse to the statement made by John 
Bassett who said: "There was no disposition to meddle with the 
tariff during the four lean years that followed 18'(5. 11 8 Despite 
5curtiss, Industrial Development, 35. Also John s. Bassett, ! 
Short History of the United States 1492-1920, Macmillan, New 
York, 1924, '714. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bassett, 
United States 1492-1920. Also Edward Stanwood, American 
Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, Volume II, 
Houghton-Mifflin, New York, 1904, 195. Hereafter this work 
will be cited as Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies. 
6curt1ss, Industrial Development, 35· Also Stanwood, American 
Tariff Controversies, 197. 
'!curtiss, Industrial Development, 35. Also Stanwood, American 
Tariff Controversies, 197· 
8united states 1492-1920, 714. 
5 
what he said, it was said by Chester Wright that: "From 1875 
on, no change of importance was made."9 These statements are 
partially true but it stiLl remained that there were attempts 
to change the tariff despite the depression of the seventies.lO 
These resolutions did not pass. 
The Democratic platform in 1880, written by Colonel Henry 
1 ull Watterson, called for a 11 tariff for revenue on y. Mr. Gar-
field defended the policy of protection in numerous speeches, 
as did Mr. Blaine who was equally active in its defense. At no 
time since the Civil War has the Republican press of the coun-
try exerted a more potent influence in awakening and molding 
12 public sentiment than it did in the campaign of 1880. In 
every city and in nearly every village throughout the northern 
states there had been established, since the organization of 
the Republican party in 1856, newspapers owned and edited by 
able, learned, and patriotic men, who on every occasion when 
the vital interests of the nation were assailed, in their daily 
and weekly editorials, supported and defended the great prin-
ciples of the Republican party; exposed the errors and vicious 
9Economic History of the United States, McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1941, 690. 
10curtiss, Industrial Development, 35. 
ll Ibid., Loc. cit. Also Hicks, American Nation, 163. 
l2curtiss, Industrial Development, 42. 
6 
purposes or its adversaries, and preserved among the people an 
enlightened public sentiment and a clear conception of politica 
principle and issues. 13 In those days the people voted for 
principles rather than men. The triumph of the Republican 
party at this time had so strengthened the sentiment of the 
public in favor of the protection policy that during the suc-
ceeding twelve years, capitalists with renewed vigor and con-
fidence went about the work of developing and extending the 
business and industrial enterprises of the country. 
The chief arguments against the protective policy at this 
time were: 1) That under the existing tariff laws a large sur-
plus drawn from the people was being accumulated in the treas-
ury, which, by a reduction of duties, would be released and em-
ployed in the promotion of business enterprises. 2) That the 
country was suffering from the overproductive capacity of the 
American people which was so largely in excess of national 
powers of consumption that a foreign market or outlet was neces 
sary in order that labor might be more fully employed and that 
the industrial development of the United States could best be 
promoted by an exchange of our domestic productions for the 
manufactures of foreign countries. 14 !~r. Curtiss felt that "th 
evils of a large surplus and the benefits to be derived from an 
13 . Ibid., loc. cit. 
14 4 Ibid., 3· 
7 
extensive foreign trade were made conspicuous topics in the 
discussion of the tariff question by the free traders, when in 
fact their real purpose was not so much to secure an increase 
of the exports of the United States as to increase the importa-
tion of foreign-made articles.nl5 That there was room for a 
revision of the tariff at this time on sound protection lines 
for the purpose of reducing revenues, correcting inequalities, 
and perfecting some of the protectionist features of the exist-
ing laws was recognized by the Republican party. 
John Kasson of, Iowa on January 9, 1882, introduced a bill 
to appoint a commission to investigate the tariff and internal 
revenue. After being referred to the Committee on Ways and 
Means, it did not come up for discussion until March. On 
April 6, William McKinley of Ohio spoke in favor of the com-
mission, declaring it to be sound and good, but advised against 
any general revision of the tariff. A revision was therefore 
undertaken but it was not to be accomplished until the most 
thorough investigation of existing conditions could be had. On 
May 15, 1882, Congress passed an act directing President Arthur 
to appoint nine commissioners from civil life to 
• • • take into consideration and to thoroughly 
investigate the various questions relating to 
the agricultural, commercial, mercantile, manu-
facturing, mining, and industrial interests of 
the United States, so far as the same may be 
necessary to the establishment of a judicious 
tariff, or a revision of the existing tariff, 
upon a scale of justice to all interests, and 
for the purpose of fully explaining the mat-
ters which may come before it. Said commis-
sion, in the prosecution of its inquiries, is 
empowered to visit such different portions 
and sectio~g of the country as it may deem 
advisable. 
8 
The commission spent the summer traveling through the coun 
try and taking testimony from over 600 witnesses, chiefly ad-
vocates of the protective system.17 In spite of the fact that 
its chairman, John L. Hayes of Massachusetts, was the secretary 
of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, and that the 
three other members (George Oliver of Pennsylvania, Garland of 
Illinois, and Kenner of Louisiana) were the avowed representa-
tives of the protected industries of iron, wool, and sugar, 
their report was submitted to Congress in December, 1882. It 
justified the assertion of the commission that it had divested 
itself of "political bias, sectional prejudice, or considera-
tions of personal interest.ul8 They surprised Congress and the 
public by recommending a "substantial reduction of the tariff 
duties • • • demanded not by the best conservative opinion of 
16Ibid., 49. Also Bassett, United States 1492-1920, 715. 
17r~zzey, American Adventure, 158. Also Curtiss, Industrial 
Development, 49. 
18Muzzey, American Adventure, 158-159. 
9 
the country."19 The report suggested a bill lowering the tar-
iff by at least 20%; and President Arthurt who urged an enlar~ 
ment of' the free list and reductions and simplifications in the 
duties on iron, steel, cotton, wool, sugar, molasses, and silk, 
would have gladly approved such a bill as the commission pro-
posed.20 Bills carrying duties higher than those which the 
commission proposed were prepared in both Houses; and when nei-
ther House would accept the other's bill, a conference commit-
tee reported a compromise bill which revealed clearly enough 
that neither party in Congress believed in tariff reform. 
Thomas B. Reed craftily manipulated the conference commit-
tee so that it contained a majority of protectionists. The 
bill they presented was still higher than the others. Senators 
Nelson Aldrich and William McKinley were also prominent in con-
nection wlth this bill. Senator McKinley refused to vote for 
it because the rates were too low. 21 Senator Aldrich, a eta 
protectionist, took side with the able defenders of the doc-
trine in the discussion of this tarift.22 He was an active 
member of the conference committee. Senator Aldrich defended 
l9Ibid., 159. 
20Ibid. 
21Bassett, United States 1492-1920, 715. 
22Allan Johnson, ed., Dictionarx of American ~iography, 
Scribner's, New York, 1928, 152. 
10 
the committee's report on the ground "that th~ resulting bill 
at least did not make any real increase in the tariff and that 
such changes as were accepted were due to convincing represen-
tations made to the conference by interested industries." 23 
The compromise bill Just squeezed through the Senate by a vote 
of 42 to 31, with the help of the protectionist Democrat 
Senator McPherson of New Jersey, and the votes of 16 Eastern 
Democrats in the House. 24 To the Democratic party, the tariff 
bill was unsatisfactory, as it accomplished nothing for which 
the free traders were contending. The operation of the measure 
during the seven years which followed demonstrated that many 
duties had been reduced below the protective po1nt. 25 The 
mistakes made by the Congress in framing the act of March 3, 
1883, were to be remedied by the enactment of the ~!cKinley bill 
of 1890. 
The revenue act of 1883 left the tariff almost the same, 
although it reduced the surplus by removing a number of the 
internal revenue taxes; namely, the taxes on bank deposits and 
capital, and the stamp duties on bank checks, perfumery, cos-
metics, patent medicines, playing cards, and matches. 
2~athaniel w. Stephenson, Nelson w. Aldrich, ! Leader in 
American Politics, Scribner's, New York, 1930, 50. 
24Muzzey, American Adventure, 159. 
25curtiss, industrial Development, 52. 
11 
The Democratic House which assembled in December, 1883, 
with the largest majority for ten years, made two futile at-
tempts to revise the tariff. William R. Morrison of Illinois, 
Democratic Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, reported a 
bill on March 11, 1884, which provided for a horizontal reduc-
tion of 20% on all existing duties. 26 It further provided that 
no duty should fall below the rate provided by the Morril Act 
of 1861. It placed salt, lumber, and coal on the free list, 
and reduced other articles twenty percent.27 This would have 
lowered the surplus about thirty million dollars. In spite of 
the Democratic majority in the House, the Morrison bill was 
rejected on May 6, 1885, by a vote of 155 to 159; the Democrat 
Samuel J. Randall leading the attack against it. 28 Mr. McKin-
ley attacked the bill for the lack of care and skill in its 
preparation. Senator Nelson Aldrich was a prominent man in the 
tariff debates that took place for he was a staunch protection-
1st and high tariff man. Six days later Abram S. Hewitt of New 
York proposed a somewhat more moderate bill with reductions, 
but it was also rejected even before coming to a vote on it. 29 
26Ibid., 53. Also Muzzey, American Adventure, 159; Bassett, 
united States 1492-1920, 715. 
27Ibid. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 53. 
28Muzzey, American Adventure, 159. 
29Ibid., 160. 
12 
The net result of all the agitation of traveling commissions 
and conference committees anu heated debates in Congress in 
President Arthur's administration was an act reducing the rates 
about twenty percent. 
The Democratic platform of 1884 merely promised tariff 
revision in the spirit of fairness and without injury to Ameri-
can industry. The tariff issue during the presidential cam-
paign of 1884 was not clearly drawn, for the majority of the 
Democrats appeared to favor a low tariff while the great major-
ity of the Republicans seemed to prefer a high tariff. Grover 
Cleveland was not elected as a tariff reformer, and in his an-
nual messages or 1885 and 1886, he had little to say on this 
question. In December, 1885, he suggested the adoption of a 
tariff for revenue only, and a bill to that effect was intro-
duced into the Congress but was rejected. In 1886 President 
Cleveland renewed h~s arguments for reduction but Congress 
paid no heed. The country must be appealed to so the President 
devoted his entire message of 1887 to the tariff question. The 
Democrats had a majority in the House but there was a Repub-
lican majority in the Senate. President Cleveland demanded "a 
tariff for revenue and pointed out most forcibly the dangers of 
surplus financiering."3° He disclaimed the advocacy of free 
trade which his opponents imputed to him, and said, in a phrase 
30Bassett, United States 1492-1920, '721. 
13 
that was often repeated: "It is a condition that confronts us, 
not a theory.u3l 
Cleveland knew that he could not force the Republicans to 
accept a low tariff but he could, he did believe, force the 
Democrats to favor a reduction in the tariff. Mr. Roger Q. 
Mills of Texas, as chairman of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, promptly reported a bill calling for reductions from an 
average level ot' about 47% to an average level of about 40%.32 
'I'he bill was presented on April 2, 1888, entirely prepared 
without hearings and investigation.33 It transferred nearly 
all raw materials and many partly manufactured articles to the 
free list. The general debate continued in the House from 
April 17 to Hay 19, and the discussion by paragraph lasted from 
May 31 to July 19.34 It was one of the longest and most nota-
ble debates on the tarirr which had held the attention of Con-
gress since the formation of the government. President Cleve-
land watched the bill closely as it went through the House by a 
majority of 15 (162-147). He was believed to have secured its 
31Bassett, United States 1492-1920, '721. 
32Ibid. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 66. 
33Muzzey, American Adventure, 180. Also Hicks, American 
Nation, 209. 
34curtiss, Industrial Development, 66. 
14 
passage by threatening to veto bills for public buildings.35 
In the Senate it was referred to the Finance Committee where it 
remained until October 3, when the Committee reported a substi-
tute bill, in harmony with the Republican policy.36 It was 
passed by the Senate on January 22, 1889, by a vote of 32 to 
30. As anticipated, the House refused to accept the Senate 
bill, and the Senate would not accept the Mills Bill. Although 
the bill did not then become law, the work of the Republican 
Senators in its preparation was not wasted, for their thorough 
investigation laid the foundation for perfecting the McKinley 
bill which was adopted the following year.37 The opposition in 
Congress was due partly to the policies proposed, partly to 
sectional economic rivalry, partly to inevitable habits of 
partisanship, but chiefly to the sedulous cultivation by the 
Republicans of the suspicion that a Democratic administration 
could not prove equal to the country's needs or worthy of the 
country's trust.38 Such is the story of the frustration of 
President Cleveland's efforts to revise the tariff. 
The Democratic platform of 1888 gave allegiance to the 
American system of protection and, with a squint at the sur-
35~.ruzzey, American Adventure, 180. 
36Ibid., 179. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 67. 
37Bassett, United States 1492-1220, 725. 
38MUzzey, American Adventure, 180. 
15 
plus, demanded liberal appropriations for the Navy and pen-
sions. They denounced the protective policy as imposing upon 
the American people a system of unjust taxation and indorsed 
and recommended the early passage of the Mills Bill.39 The 
Republicans unequivocally accepted the issue made by Mr. Cleve-
land and declared "uncompromisingly in favor of the American 
system of protection ••• The protective system must be main-
tained ••• we denounce the Mills bill ••• "40 The campaign 
which followed was one of the most notable controversies on the 
subject of protection versus free trade in the history of the 
country. The President's message had aroused to action every 
protectionist, Democrat or Republican. The Republican party 
was returned to power, with its majority in the Senate in-
creased as also in the House. Benjamin Harrison of Indiana was 
elected President but the Republicans had never hoped for much 
from him since they desired legislation, so they put their 
faith in Congress.41 
The Republican party, in entering upon the legislation of 
1890, was prompted not only by a spirit.of patriotism, but con-
trolled by the same statesmanship which had guided the founder 
of the republic in establishing the American _system. The 
39curtise, Industrial Development, 98. 
40Ibid. 
41Hicks, American Nation, 214. 
16 
policy for the protection and extension of the industries of 
the country advocated by the Republican party was embodied in 
the McKinley Bill. This was a step in advance. In keeping 
with the will of the people, as expressed by the election of 
1888, and in harmony with the principles of the Republican 
party, the 51st Congress entered upon a revision of the tariff. 
Mr. McKinley received the Senate's tariff bill of 1889 and re-
vised it. 
President Harrison recommended a revision of our tariff 
both in its administrative features and in the schedulee. 42 
He recognized that the adjustment of the tariff was a "matter 
of great delicacy because of its direct effect upon the busi-
ness of the country," but he believed that any temporary ill 
effects would be reduced to the minimum by prompt action.43 
The protective principle, he contended, should be maintained 
and "fairly applied to the products of our farms as well as of 
our shops."44 He declared that the effects of the duties were 
not to be judged by fixing our eye on the public treasury 
alone. President Harrison believed that "they have a direct 
relation to home production, to work, to wages, and to the com-
mercial independence of our country; and the wise and patriotic 
42~ruzzey, American Adventure, 201. 
43Ibid. 
44rbid. 
,.. 
17 
legislator should enlarge the field of his vision to include 
all of these. "45 
In April, 1890, McKinley as chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, introduced a bill increasing the duties of the tar-
iff. It passed the House and finally got through the Senate. 
The chief features were as follows: 46 
1) The duties on agricultural products were slightly 
raised to please the rural West, but raw sugar was put on the 
free list and a bounty of two cents a pound for four years was 
offered to domestic sugar producers. A duty was placed on re"!". 
fined sugar to protect the American refiners. 
2) The rates on bulky iron articles were little changed; 
in some cases they were actually lowered. 
3) Less bulky articles, as woolens, cottons, and shoes 
produced near the coast line were given higher rates. 
4) Through James G. Blaine's efforts a system of reciproc-
ity was adopted, intended to secure trade from South American 
States. Hides, molasses, tea and coffee, as well as sugar, 
were to be free, but if the president thought a state producing 
these articles charged unfair duties against us, he might im-
pose duties on them at specified rates. 
45Ibid. 
46Bassett, United States 1492-1920, 725. Also David S. Muzzey, 
History of the American People, Ginn, New York, 1927, 467. 
Hereafter this work will be cited as Muzzey, American People. 
18 
It was expected that the embarrassing surplus would be re-
duced some $70 million by the abolition of the duty on imported 
sugar in the United States. According to Mr. Curtiss, the bill 
had two objects:47 
1) To reduce revenue, but without destroying any protec-
tive features of our tariff system. This was done to the ex-
tent of $42 million, and for the first time in the history of 
the United States, more than half of all our imports in value 
were admitted free of duty. 
2) To develop and increase American industries and give 
employment to a greater number of American laborers. New in-
dustries were established on every hand; other industries were 
imported from abroad; thousands of establishments were enlarged 
all of which gave employment to an increased number of laborers 
and in most cases a·t higher wages. 
It contained no concessions or compromises; it took no 
backward step, for it was the outcome of a realization of the 
part of the protectionists that the people themselves would 
have to decide between protection and free trade. 48 The bill 
passed the House on May 21, 1890, by a vote of 164 (all Repub-
lican) to 142 (all Democrat), but in the Senate it met with a 
47curtiss, Industrial Development, 128-130. 
48 4 Ibid., 2 5· 
19 
delay of nearly four months.49 The cause of the delay was not 
any hostility of the Republican majority of the Senate to the . 
principle of protection, or to the terms of the bill itself, 
but was connected with other legislation. It was September, 
1890, before the McKinley Bill was passed by this house, and 
the let of October before it became law. Since John Quincy 
Adams' days, it was the first high tariff based upon the pro-
tective principle solely and not dictated by the needs of the 
Treasury. It was also the first tariff whose rates came home 
directly to every family in the country. Only the producers 
seemed to have been considered; the consumer was ignored. 
Mr. Cleveland was reelected in 1892 mainly on the tariff 
issue, and his concern for tariff reform.was even greater in 
his second administration than in his first. The effect of the 
McKinley bill was the raising of rates to unprecedented levels. 
Abroad we were charged with raising a Chinese wall around our 
trade.SO Importations decreased, to the great loss of the 
merchants. President Cleveland proposed a moderate reduction 
and readJustment to meet the large revenue needs which the per-
manent expenditures of the Republicans fixed on the government. 
He had his way in the Democratic House where William L. Wilson 
of West Virginia was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. 
49Muzzey, American Adventure, 203. 
50sassett, United States 1492-1920, 728. 
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The bill, whlch he reported on December 2, 1893, was the result 
of much labor, and its chief features were:51 
1) Free raw material, as lumber, coal, wool, iron ore, and 
sugar. 
2) It reduced appreciably the duties on most factory-made 
articles, as silks, woolens, cottons, glass, and crockery. 
3) To repair the deficiency in revenues which would thus 
ensue, it raised the internal tax on liquors and laid a tax of 
2% on incomes over $4000. 
This last feature was declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in 1895 in a five to four decision. The House 
passed it on a vote of 182 to 106. In the Senate many sched-
ules were raised as they thought the bill inadequate to the 
needs of the revenue. It made no difference that the Senate 
was Democratic. The ''coal Senators .. of West Virginia, the 
"iron Senators" of Alabama, the "sugar Senatorstt of Louisiana, 
and the "lumber Senators" of Montana, fought for the protection 
of their interests. Under the lead of the Democratic Senator 
Gorman of Maryland (sugar Senator), the Wilson bill was muti-
lated beyond recognition by over 600 amendments.52 Most of the 
McKinley rates were restored. The opposition here to President 
51Ibid. Also Muzzey, American People, 486. Also Curtiss, In-
dUStrial Development, 269. 
52 Ibid., 271. Also Hicks, American Nation, 258. 
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Cleveland had grown into a habit. The House protested in vain 
against the amendments, and reluctantly accepted it. This 
bill thoroughly disgusted the President who called it a piece 
of ttparty perfidy and dishonor."53 It became law on August 28, 
1890, without his signature, because if he had vetoed the bill, 
the McKinley Act would remain in operation. The Gorman-Wilson 
Act, as it is called, was unsatisfactory to the greater major!~ 
of the Democratic members of Congress who favored not merely 
tariff reform but absolute free trade. 
The events of 1895 to 1897 are outstanding in American 
history. By President Cleveland's inaugural address, and by 
the fact that for the execution of his tariff leveling plan, 
he had back of him a majority both in the House and in the 
Senate, wise manufacturers and business men were sufficiently 
warned of what was coming. Therefore, both wholesale and job-
bing merchants immediately ceased buying of American manufac-
turers and held themselves in readiness to make their purchases 
from the cargoes of goods made by the poorly paid labor of 
Europe.54 Thus said Mr. Curtiss: 
• • • the demand for American made goods fell 
off; and manufacturers, being unable to sell 
their products readily, either closed their 
mills, or ran them only when necessary to fill 
immediate and pressing orders; for it was 
53Muzzey, American People, 487. 
54rndustr1al Development, 285. 
merely business suicide for them to go on pay-
ing American wages and piling up quantities of 
goods which, within a few months, they must 
sell in competition with similar articles 
brought in from abroad.55 
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According to Mr. Curtiss, the consequence of this slacken-
ing of industry was "that our cities were soon filled with un-
employed labor; the spendable incomes of the people were either 
largely diminished or entirely cut off; everybody economized in 
food and clothing. 11 56 He wisely writes that in calculating the 
results of the Gorman-Wilson Tariff: "We must consider the in-
direct as well as the direct effects; for the anticipation of 
the law brought evils that should not be ignored in estimating 
the actual effect of the law itself."57 A financial panic and 
industrial depression began in 1893· Wage reductions were in-
evitable and lack of employment inflicted hardships on the 
people. 
The Gorman-Wilson Tariff, although designed as a revenue 
measure, had failed to provide the government with the suf-
ficient funds to pay its running expenses. The receipts of the 
government had constantly diminished until the deficiency had 
reached about $74 billion. The closing of the mills, the en-
forced idleness of labor, and the bankruptcy and ruin of busi-
55rbid. 
56Ibid. 
57rbid., 289-290. 
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ness men made the loss to the whole country incalculable. In 
conclusion, it may be said that the hard times which visited 
our country under this Democratic revision of the tariff re-
sulted from a wage famine.58 
The Republican party was called upon by the people to 
redeem the country from the disasters which an unwise economic 
policy had forced upon it. Protectionism, discredited in the 
election of 1892, was approved by the people in 1894 and 1896. 
Both tariff policies of the opposing political parties had now, 
for the first time since 1860, been given a trial. The wisdom 
of the policy of protection had been tested and proved by ac-
tual experience. The great protectionists of the country dur-
ing all the years of the heated controversy from 1867 to 1892 
had defended it by the presentation of indisputable facts show-
ing the wonderful progress which the country had made under and 
by an actual trial of the economic principles for which they 
contended. The people for the first time since 1860 had now 
turned the control of all branches of the government over to 
the Democratic party and had given it full power to destroy the 
protective policy and establish and put into practice the reve-
nue policy for which it had contended.59 The people now had 
had the actual experience of witnessing the operation of the 
58Ibid., 307. 
59rbid., 322. 
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two opposing systems in practice. 
The people were quick to realize their error. The upris-
ing against the Democratic free trade policy began as soon as 
Grover Cleveland, on March 4, 1893, made it clear that the 
purpose of the Democratic party was not a moderate revision of 
the tariff, but the restoration of free trade and what seemed 
the destruction of industries.6° The Republican platforms of 
1894 pledged them to the support of the protective policy. 
The attempt on the part of the Democratic party to over-
throw the protective policy had proved such an utter failure 
that it dared not at this time make the tariff an issue in the 
approaching election and attempted to justify the Gorman-
Wilson Act. Mr. Cleveland, who had endeavored to make effectu-
al the tariff policy of his party, retired from office utterly 
repudiated and intensely unpopular with its rank and file. 
During the closing months of his administration, the Ways and 
Means Committee, under the leadership of Mr. Dingley, was pre-
paring the new tariff bill for presentation to the extra ses-
sion of Congress, which it was known President McKinley would 
convene soon after his inauguration on March 4, 1897.61 Be-
tween December 28, 1896 and January 11, 189'7 the Ways and Means 
Committee granted hearings to the various interests of the 
60ibid., 322-323. 
61Ibid., 231. 
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country concerning the preparation of the many schedules of th 
new bill.62 The work of the preparation of the schedules was 
begun on January 13. Each schedule was taken up and carefully 
analyzed, and new rates, so far as it had been demonstrated 
were necessary to restore the adequate protection to American 
labor and American manufacturers, were inserted. The bill 
when completed was substantially a redraft of the McKinley Act, 
although the rates of duties on certain articles were lower 
than those contained in the former measure. Mr. Dingley said: 
ttThe bill has two purposes, namely, to raise additional reve-
nue, and to encourage the industries of the United States. 116 3 
The bill was presented to the House on March 18 and the 
discussion began on March 22, 1897.64 It was reported to the 
Senate, after passing the House, by Mr. Aldrich of Rhode 
Island, May 4, and was taken up for consideration May 25.65 
It passed the Senate on July 7, and was reported back to the 
House with the Senate amendments, July 8. While in the Senate 
it met the usual fate of all tariff bills. Before the sheep-
raisers and fruit-growers of the West were as well satisfied a 
the manufacturers of the East and the new industrial leaders o 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid., 332. 
64Ibid. , 333. 
65Ibid. 
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the South, the bill had undergone 872 amendments. 66 The amend-
ments thus were more than those of the Gorman-Wilson Act of 
1894. But the Republican House was not seriously opposed to 
the enhanced schedules as the Democratic House had been three 
years previously. The amended bill was passed in both houses 
by votes fairly representative of the Republican ·majorities 
(187 to 116, and 40 to 30), and was signed by President McKin-
ley on July 24, 1897.67 
It imposed duties which in general were not as high as 
those contained in the McKinley Law, but were the highest rates 
in our history. It was, in the words of Professor Frank W. 
Taussig, "the outcome of an aggressive spirit of protection."68 
The duties of the Dingley Act were as follows:69 
1) On woolens, cottons, silks, linens, glass and crockery 
the rates varied little from the tariff of 1890, but were high-
er. 
2) On iron and steel products the lower rates of 1894 were 
retained. Copper was left on the free list as in 1894. The 
66Muzzey, American Adventure, 334. 
67Ibid. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 333· 
68Frank w. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 
Putnam's, New York, 1931, 358. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Taussig, Tariff History of the United States. 
69curtiss, Industrial Development, 333· Also Bassett, United 
States 1492-1920, 729-730. Also Stanwood, American Tariff 
Controversies, 381. 
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duty on raw sugar was doubled and the differential of protec-
tion for the refiner was maintained. 
3) The schedules imposing duties on agricultural products, 
pottery, liquors, and tobacco were higher. 
4) The rates on lumber and manufacture of lumber, bags, 
cotton bagging and cotton ties were restored. 
The Dingley Tariff within two years brought ample revenue 
to the Treasury and raised the nation from the most distressin 
conditions of unemployment and business depression to a state 
of full employment of labor and universal business prosperity. 
It not only redeemed the country from the unwise economic 
policy adopted by the Democrats, but it consummated the plan 
of rounding out the industrial policy of the nation for which 
the Republican party had struggled for more than twenty years. 
For twelve years after the passage of the Dingley Tariff, 
reform was quiescent. According to Mr. Bassett: "The attack 
on the Cleveland Democracy showed that protection was very 
strongly fortified in our economic system. Capital and labor 
both felt themselves interested in perpetuating it."70 The 
progress of urban life, so largely dependent on factory and in-
ternal commerce, widened the basis of the movement. In the 
eighties, the tariff reform sentiment of the West centered in 
the Old Northwest; in the nineties, this region was mostly for 
70united States 1492-1920, 730. 
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protection.71 
The political conditions under which the Act of 1897 was 
passed, and the commercial and industrial conditions that have 
prevailed during the years it has been in operation, have been 
as favorable to its success as those conditions which applied 
to the two preceding acts (1890 and 1894) were favorable. 
Meanwhile 'prosperity had returned to the country. Mr. Stanwood 
said that "Good crops, an ample market, and high prices reward-
ed the efforts of the farmers, and enabled them to pay off a 
vast amount of mortgage indebtedness which they had been tempt-
ed to wipe off with a :free silver sponge."72 Every avenue of 
commerce was crowded, every industry was full of activity, 
every branch of trade felt the impulse of good times. Such are 
not the conditions that drive men to seek changes in the tari:t'f 
laws. Indeed, they lead rather to a disposition to attribute 
too much importance to the law which seems to them to have pro-
duced results so satisfactory. In 1897, the country was ready 
for a season of great prosperity. The industrial depression as 
a check to activity was substantially completed. The uncer-
tainty as to the monetary standard was dispelled. In short, 
all things were made easy for the success of the tariff. 
President McKinley had recommended that the tariff be so 
71Ibid. 
72stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, 390. 
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revised as 
• • • to raise revenue • • • preserve the home 
markets to our own producers ••• revive and 
increase manufactures • • • relieve and encour-
age agriculture • • • to aid and develop min-
ing • • • and to render to labor in every field 
of useful occupation the liberal wages and ade-
quate rewards to7which skill and industry are justly entitled. ;) 
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The doctrine professed by the Republican leaders of a 
generation ago, namely, of a tariff for revenue only, with in-
cidental protection, had already been repudiated in the Repub-
lican platform of 1888. It was now definitely abandoned. To 
be sure, the Dingley Law contained provisions for reciprocity 
agreements which would reduce the rates by about 25%, and 
which the Senate refused to ratify. The Dingley Law has the 
distinction of having remained in force longer than any other 
tariff act in our history (1897 to 1909). The period was one 
of almost uninterrupted prosperity. 
The tariff plank of the Republican platform of 1904 de-
clared as follows: 
• • .Protection which guards and develops our 
industries is a cardinal principle of the Re-
publican party. The measure of' protection 
should always at least equal the difference 
in the cost of production at home and abroad. 
We insist upon the maintenance of the 
principle of protection, and therefore, rates 
of duty should be adjusted only when condi-
tions have so changed that the public interest 
demands their alteration; but this work cannot 
73curtiss, Industrial Development, 334. 
safely be committed to any other h~~ds than 
those of the RepubLican party •• • 'f 
President Theodore Roosevelt had stated: 
••• The general tariff poLicy to which, with-
out regard to changes in detail, I believe this 
country is irrevocably committed, is fundamental-
ly based upon ample recognition of the difference 
between the cost of production--that is, the cost 
of labor--here and abroad, and of the need to see 
to it that our laws shall in no event afford ad-
vantage in our market to foreign industries over 
American industries, to foreign capital over 
American capital, to foreign labor over our own 
labor ••• The tariff is essentially a business 
proposition. We must preserve the policy of 
protection ••• 75 
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The protective policy had been sustained in all of its 
integrity during the three years of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt's 
occupancy of the Presidential chair. It was during this time 
that he launched a new policy, that of attacks against the cor-
porations and trusts. There was a widespread conviction in the 
minds of the American people that the great corporations were 
in certain of their features and tendencies harmful to the 
general welfare. They should not be prohibited, according to 
Mr. Roosevelt, but supervised and within reasonable limits con-
trolled.76 The government, he averred, had the constitutional 
74Ibid., 345. 
75Ibid. , 346. 
'76M'uzzey, American Adventure, 381. 
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right to regulate interstate commerce.77 In order that it 
might do so with wisdom and justice, it was necessary that 
those corporation engaged in interstate commerce should will-
ingly submit to a full and free investigation. Mr. Muzzey 
. 
stated that: "President Roosevelt was not opposed to big busi-
ness as such. He realized that concentration in industry was a 
natural and inevitable form of development of our great re-
sources.u7S The great corporations, especially those which 
practically monopolized such necessities of life as coal, oil, 
beef, and sugar, should be supervised and within reasonable 
limits controlled. They had received privileges and protection 
from the government, and they increased in return the obliga-
tion to the people of a strictly legal and honest conduct of 
their business. President Roosevelt believed that they should 
not be allowed to reap fabulous profits by charging exorbitant 
prices or by securing illegal privileges from the legisla-
tures.79 In order that the government might regulate interstat 
commerce with wisdom and justice, the Interstate Commerce Act 
should be made more clear and specific, and a new Department of 
Commerce and Industry should be created to deal with those in-
terests of the government which concerned the corporation, labo 
77Ibid. 
78Muzzey, American People, 533· 
79Ibid. 
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and the merchant marine.80 
It was President Roosevelt's idea that the trust question 
should be dealt with entirely apart from the tariff question, 
and that the destruction of industries of the country by the 
overthrow of the protective policy was not the method to be 
adopted in dealing with the so-called trusts and monopolies. 
Tariff revision had certainly never been one of the Roosevelt 
policies. He always found an excuse to avoid the issue which 
was fraught with so many political perils. While there was 
much agitation favoring a revision of the tariff during the 
latter part of President Roosevelt's first administration, it 
dld not assume formidable proportions, nor was it sufficiently 
pronounced to occasion any alarm in the minds of the great mass 
of the people. He resisted all overtures for taking up and re-
opening the tariff question during his first administration. 
80ibid. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NEED FOR A NEW TARIFF 
The Dingley Tariff of' 1897 was enacted because of a defi-
cit in the operations of the Treasury of the United States, and 
President McKinley asked the Congress for legislation dealing 
solely with the import duties and revenue. This tariff was the 
outcome of an aggressive spirit of protection and it pushed 
this protection in many directions over our domestic indue-
tries. The country felt confident after it was passed by Con-
gress, and began to recover lost ground and to make up the 
deficits in various products. This also led to the renewal of 
domestic and foreign trade, and our revenues rapidly increased. 
The closing years of the nineteenth century had found new 
conditions which became of greater consequence for our customs 
policy. As the United States was a great manufacturing coun-
try, we did not depend upon the rest of the world for many 
ready-made products. But it was thought that the industries 
were over-protected and the Republicans doubted whether that 
policy had not been carried too far. The protective system 
was of less consequence as industry produces more abundantly 
and cheaply. 
Perhaps the most potential reenforcement of the clamor 
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for the tariff revision came from the Presidential office of 
Mr. Theodore Roosevelt during his second administration. In 
1906 he sent forth the dictum that the tariff should be revised 
Thus, nearly two years before the election of 1908, it was or-
dained that the Republican party should discredit its own tar-
iff legislation, and hold up the hands of its assailants by 
pledging itself to another revision of the tariff. The Repub-
lican Convention of 1908 found itself placed in an embarrassing 
predicament. To refuse to declare for a tariff revision meant 
a reflection upon and partial repudiation of a Republican ad-
ministration. President Roosevelt, during the Republican Con-
vention of 1908, expressed the party's sentiments regarding the 
dominant issue of tariff legislation. He stated: 
••• The Republican party declares unequivocal-
ly for a revision of the tariff by a special 
session of Congress immediately followiyg the 
inauguration of the next President ••• 
This statement was popularly accepted as a promise to re-
vise the tariff schedules downward, and a large proportion of 
the voters specifically voted for the Republican candidate with 
this idea and expectation in mind. Gathering opposition to the 
high tariff led both the Democratic and Republican parties, in 
this Presidential campaign to adopt a plank in their political 
platforms favoring a downward revision. The Republican being 
lwilliam s. Myers, The Republican Party, Century, N. Y., 1931, 
380. 
35 
the more definite won the election and trust of the people. 
Mr. William Howard Taft, upon accepting the Republican 
nomination, said that the tariff excesses offered temptations 
to those who wouid monopolize the production and sale of such 
articles in this country to profit by the excessive rate. 2 In 
the same speech, he stated: 
••• In 1897, the Dingley Tariff bill was passed, 
under which we have had, as already said, a. period 
of enormous prosperity. The consequent material 
development has greatly changed the conditions 
under which many articles described by the sched-
ule of the tariff are now produced. The Tariff 
in a number of schedules exceeds the cost of pro-
duction of such articles abroad and at home, in-
cluding a reasonable profit to the American pro-
ducer.' 
The Tariff Act of 1897 proved to be the longest-lived be-
cause the Republican party was in power continuously during the 
twelve years it was in effect, and naturally changes were lese 
likely. Problems of greater importance pressed for solution, 
and these concerned questions of industrial combinations. 
These served to divert attention from the tariff because it was 
and is a great problem. It was this very subject which in 1909 
compelled action on the tariff. The tariff was felt to need 
overhauling because it was believed to promote industrial com-
2curtiss, Industrial Development, 365. 
3Ibid., 361. Also Hicks, American Nation, 422. 
Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 
mans, Green, N. Y., 1934,~83. 
Also Davie R. 
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binations. The huge fortunes acquired in some protected in-
dustries (the Carnegie fortune most conspicuously of all) 
brought the feeling against the high duties. The trusts and 
tarit'f are associated in the public mind, and hostility to the 
combinations had bred hostility to ex~reme protection. Hence, 
the Republican party in its campaign platform of 1908 gave a 
promise of revising the tariff. 
The pressure from public sentiment was most acute !'rom 
1904 to 1906 for the people felt that the tariff rates were too 
high and too favorable to big business. The United States, as 
a whole, prevailed upon the politicians to make a sane adjust-
ment or the schedules to the new industrial condition in the 
country; that of increased production. Many rates in the 
Dingley Act were out of harmony with these existing industrial 
conditions; and the conviction was growing, particularly in 
the Middle West, that the tariff fostered trusts which were 
exercising larger powers in the commercial and financial de-
velopment of the United States. 
According to Mr. Muzzey, the bulletins of the Bureau of 
Labor showed that the cost or necessary articles of consumption 
had risen some 40% under its operation, while wages had advan~ 
less than 20%.4 There was a widespread conviction that the ef-
fect or the high tariff was to insure enormous profits ror the 
4Muzzey, American Adventure, 485. 
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manufacturer rather than to secure any benefit to the consumer 
and the laborer. Manufactured goods had increased 32% in price 
and raw materials 50%, while wages in over 4,000 establishments 
had risen only 19.1%. At the same time the profits of the 
great combinations in the manufacture of wool, cotton, thread, 
shoes, sewing-machines, farm machinery, and scores of other 
commodities indispensable to the millions of plain working 
people in the country had grown to enormous proportions.5 
Sectional sentiment shows the type of tariff desired by 
the various portions of our country. The central northwestern 
states were chiefly devoted to wheat, or corn, and were little 
interested in manufacturing, and, therefore, developed opposi-
tion after 1900 to high duties on manufactured products. The 
northeast was the great center of manufacturing industries and 
supported a protection policy, a.s did those industries in the 
north central and Atlantic coast areas. They were joined by 
those in the same section who were interested in the protection 
of certain raw materials such as lumber, wool, beet sugar, 
coal, and iron. The Far West were vigorous defenders of pro-
tection as they were interested in lumber, certain minerals, 
cattle, sheep, beet sugar, and fruits. This section was held 
the strongest political influence in the Senate as their popu-
lation was sparse, and in alliance with the Northeast, their 
5rbid. , 485-486. 
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influence went far to shape tariff legislation. The South was 
the chief seat of the opposition to protection, but reconstruc-
tion here, after the Civil War, created a group of interests 
inclined to favor protective duties, especially those interest-
ed in the cotton mills, and the iron and steel industry in the 
South. 
There arose, during the years the Dingley Law was in ef-
1'ect, according to Mr. Wright: "Numerous signs of growing dis-
content with the high level of duties; finally this attained 
such proportions that even the party of protection admitted a 
downward revision of duties was at least politically expedi-
ent.116 An understanding of the conditione responsible for 
this discontent is desirable, not only as a help to explain 
the immediate reaction but also because some of these condi-
tions still affect the attitude of certain groups toward the 
policy of protection. At least five different causes can be 
named that exercise considerable influence in this reaction 
from 1897 to 1908.7 
1. We find a growing group of manufacturers who were be-
ginning to feel that the tariff was a handicap. Many manu-
facturers of the more highly finished products found that the 
6chester w. Wright, Economic History of the United States, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1941, 696. 
7rbid., 696-697· 
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increased cost of their raw materials, caused by the Tariff 
duties, necessitated a higher price for the product and thus 
J.imited the market. This was especially felt by those who were 
exporting manufactured products. These exporters also felt 
that the high tariff duties of this country led other coun-
tries to impose hlgh duties on American products and thus 
limited their market still further. 
2. There was the group of farmers in the Central North-
west, chiefly in the wheat-growing region, as previous.ly men-
tioned, who felt that they were burdened rather than benefited 
by the tarirf and, while seeking higher duties on their prod-
ucts, they frequently demanded lower duties on manufactured 
goode, especially on such as the farmers used. 
3. The steady rise in the general price level which oc-
curred after 1896 was causing rather general discontent and 
occasioned widespread complaint about the high cost of living. 
Though this rise was chiefly due to other causes, it was pos-
sible to argue that a reduction of duties would at least tend 
to lower the cost of many protected products. 
4. The rapid spread of the trust movement immediately 
after 1897 and the belief that the tariff was an important fac-
tor in fostering this movement caused restlessness. Here again 
the influence of the tariff was exaggerated in the popular be-
lief, though not without some foundation in fact; but the cry 
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that the tariff was the mother of the trusts and so ought to be 
abolished on trust controlled products met with popular re-
sponse. 
5. The growing sensitiveness on the part of the people to 
various forms of special privilege, aroused by the outbreak of 
the 11muck-raking 11 articles that became so numerous in the popu-
lar magazines after about 1900, and the growth of large for-
tunes were other factors. The tariff was attacked, also, as 
an iniquitous form of such privileges. The country also sud-
denly woke up to the fact that its natural resources were not 
unlimited, the movement for conservation appeared, and it was 
pointed out that by removing duties on various raw materials, 
and importing them from other countries, we would help to con-
serve our own supply of natural resources. 
Able and experienced businessmen pleaded for tariff sta-
bility for in that alone could be round the conditions which 
make for steady employment, for regularly issued pay envelopes, 
and for good business. So powerful and so sensible an appeal 
for security against the ills and evils of tariff agitation and 
tariff uncertainty, ought to have been effective in turning 
public opinion back into safe and sane channels, but it was not 
so. Professional agitators, politicians eager :ror notoriety, 
reformers, and theorists all joined in the clamor against the 
Dingley Act, and demanded wholesale reductions in the rates of 
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duty after 1907. 
The development of the need for a new tariff during 1907 
and 1908 was more acute than in the previous years. This de-
cided demand for a revision gave to the tariff question an im-
portance previously denied to it, and had rendered definite 
action imperative. The business public was the necessary force 
1n the demand for revision, as public opinion throughout the 
country could do little to secure legislation.8 The business 
men found themselves hampered in several ways by the terms of 
the Dingley Tariff. It appeared that our trade with foreign 
countries had been incapacitated by the indisposition of these 
countries to grant to us accession to their markets so long as 
we insisted on excluding them from ours. In addition to feel-
ing the results of our tariff exclusiveness in the hostility of 
foreign countries, American manufacturers had been obliged to 
suffer from an increasing money expense in the production of 
their goods. Thus had come the demand from the business world 
that our revenue legislation be remodeled in such wise as to 
allow the business men to resort economically to the best 
sources of supply available anywhere within competitive reach. 
Another source of pressure, that culminated in a recogni-
tion for the need of a new tariff, came from the changed tariff 
8H. Parker Willis, Ed., "The Impending Tariff Struggle," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, University of Chicago, Chicago, 
1910, v. 17, January, 1909, 1. 
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methods of foreign countries, who were unduly discriminating 
against the United States. Finally, our own officials recog-
nized the confused state of the present practices under the 
Dingley tariff. When James Sherman was nominated for the Vice-
Presidency, he stated: 
• • • The Dingley bill when enacted was well 
adapted to the then existing conditions. The 
development of industrial prosperity in a 
decade, which in volume and degree have sur-
passed our most roseate expectations, have so 
altered conditione that in certain details of 
schedules they no longer in ~very particular 
mete out justice to all ••• ~ 
The Republican platform carried a new version of the prin-
ciple of protection. The doctrine was laid down as follows: 
••• In all protective legislation the true 
principle of protection is beet maintained 
by the imposition of such duties as will equal 
the difference between the cost of production 
at home and abroad, together with ~0reasonable profit to American industries ••• 
This was welcomed in many sections as the definite solu-
tion of the question. It had an engaging appearance of modera-
tion, yet it leads logically to the most extreme results. Pro-
fessor Taussig said that it seems to say no favors--nothing but 
9The 6lst Congress, The Tariff Act of 12.Q2, 232. Hereafter 
this work will be cited as The 6let Congress. Also Curtiss, 
Industrial Development, 365. 
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equalization of conditions. 11 He said that "The true principle 
means that duties should be high enough to cause anything and 
everything to be made within the country, and for international 
trade to cea.se."l2 But it really is that the more disadvan-
tageous it is for a country to carry on an industry, the more 
desperate should be the effort to cause the industry to be 
established. 13 The attention given to this,"true principle" 
was important of some compliance to those who believed that 
protection had been carried too far. Our duties were believed 
to have been more than sufficient to equalize trade, and to 
have brought more than a reasonable profit to American pro-
ducers. A protective tariff brings necessary revenues to the 
government and, in addition, scatters its protection to every 
section of the country and to the people in every occupation 
and calling. 
It is a protection to opportunity. Representative C. 
Bascom Slemp of Virginia said that the policy of a protective 
tariff is automatic in its action, uniform and imperative in 
its application, and impartial in its operation. 14 According 
llTaussig, Tariff History of the u. ~~ 365. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
l4congressional Record, March 27, 1909, Volume 44, Part I, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.i 439-440. Here 
after this work will be ci~ed as Congressiona Record. Also 
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to Representative George Sturgiss of West Virginia, this polio 
develops the resources and increases the wealth and prosperity 
of a nation, making it independent commercially, financially, 
and politically.15 The Republican party held the commission o 
the people of the United States to revise the tariff upon the 
lines of "true protection" and upon no other lines, and the 
Republican party would be recreant to the trust of the America 
people if they did not follow implicitly those lines. 
In Mr. Taft's inaugural address on March 4, 1909, he said 
that the tariff bill would be introduced at an extra session of 
Congress on March 15. In this speech he stated: 
• • • This should secure an adequate revenue 
and adjust the duties in such a manner as to 
afford to labor and to all industries in this 
country, whether of the farm, mine, or fac-
tory, protection by tariff equal to the dif-
ference between the cost of production abroad 
and the cost of production here, and have a 
provision which shall put into force, upon 
executive determination of certain facts, a 
higher or maximum tariff against those coun-
tries whose trade requires such discrimination.l6 
This may have meant anything or nothing at a11, and Taft 
was forced to declare whether he intended only to revise the 
15congressional Record, April 3, 1909, Volume 44, Part I, 1026. 
Also 6lst Congress, 91. 
16congressional Record, March 4, 1909, Volume 44, Part I, 2-3. 
Also New York Daily Tribune, March 5, 1909. Also Marion M. 
Miller, ed., Revenue: The Tariff and Taxation, (volume XII 
of Great Debates in American History}, Current Literature, 
New York, 1913, ;Db. Hereafter this work will be cited as 
Miller, Revenue. 
45 
tariff, or to revise it downward. He pledged his efforts to 
secure a reduction of the Tariff of 1897· To say is one thing, 
to act and do is quite another. 
The reason why ex-President Roosevelt took no active part 
in this question at this time was that he sailed to Africa. 
He wished to give President Taft a free hand and not arouse 
any ill feeling in his fol~owers.~7 A slight difference of 
understanding between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft caused the 
two friends to drift apart after the Republican Convention. It 
was natural that President Taft desired independence in his 
administration to ascertain his own policies and to choose his 
own cabinet men. Out of Roosevelt's cabinet, Tart retained 
only two men, whi~e six were chosen as personal appointees 
rather than as party leaders, and one t'or his service in McKin-
ley's and Roosevelt's administrations. The new president was 
not hostile to reform and approved of the major po.licies or 
Theodore Roosevelt. By temperament and training, he was de-
liberate and cautious; he walked sedately; he was an honest ad-
ministrator; and was a champion of the protective policy. He 
is comparable to Mr. Roosevelt who charged ahead with confi-
dence and dash. 
President Taft at once carried out his campaign pledge by 
calling the 6lst Congress in special session to meet on 
17Hicks, American Nation, 422. 
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March 15, 1909. The bill to revise the tariff already had 
been drawn up by the Committee of Ways and Means in the House 
of Representatives of which Senero Payne of New York was the 
chairman. This committee had already held hearings at Washing-
ton, that is, of hearing, the representatives of hundreds of 
interests, protected and unprotected, who pled for the continu-
ance or the grant of the government's favor. The hearings 
filled nearly 9,000 pages of the committee's report, and few 
of these pages contained any elucidation of the "true principle 
of protection" as defined in the platform. They are the one-
sided arguments by interested agents, each intent on showing 
that any reduction in the schedules in which he was interested 
would mean an assault on the very citadel of American industry 
and the independence of American labor. The frienas of pro-
tection were organized and alert. The "steel people," the 
"lumber pe:)ple," the "hosiery people" were vocal and even elo-
, 
quent. The "ultimate consumer'' was unheard. 
The hearings were held in Washington, D. c., beginning 
November 10, 1908, and continuing until December 22, 1908. 
Briefs and statements were submitted until as late as March 9, 
1909. All of our manufacturers and industrialists, as well as 
the agriculturalists and miners were heard. Many men who ap-
peared before the committee were concerned not only with the 
various schedules but also with the tariff revision, tariff 
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co~ission, and tariff legislation. Professor Frank W, Taussig 
appeared before the committee on December 15, 1908, and stated 
that: 
• • • in those industries where you have high 
duties, and an apparent need of high duties in 
order to maintain protected industries, I 
should strongly • • • feel against any in-
crease of duty, and I think in a great many 
instances a reduction of the duties could be 
made without serious distur£ances, and with 
advantages to the consumer. ~ 
On the subject of tariff commissions, Mr. Henry R. Towne 
of Stanford, Conn., appeared before this committee on Novem-
ber 23, 1908, and declared: 
• • • In the belief that the present tariff is 
not well adjusted to present conditions, that 
it embodies many inconsistencies and inequali-
ties, and that its careful and intelligent re-
vision will affect favorably all of our indus-
tries, and especially our foreign commerce, we 
favor the creation of a permanent tariff com-
mission for the purp9se of collecting data at 
home and abroad ••• 19 
Another representative, A~r. George s. Brown of Birmingham, 
Alabama, appeared before the committee on December 14, 1908 and 
stated that he firmly believed: 
••• that the protective principle, a vicious 
error, unscientific, ruinous, pronounced so by 
the educated political economists of all ages 
• • • will again be so demonstrated in this our 
l8sixth Congress, 2nd Session, 1908-1909, House Documents, 
Volume 145, Tariff Hearings, Volume 7, Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D. C., 1909, 7718. 
l9 Ibid. , 7587. 
age by the ignorance and selfishness of law-
makers and manufacturers ••• 2u 
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These are only a few of the great many testimonies given 
before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Repre-
sentatives. They show that many were interested in the re-
vision of the tariff as evidenced by the committee's reports. 
20Ibid., 7567 
CHAPTER III 
THE PAYNE ALDRICH BILL 
Sereno E. Payne was an American lawyer and legislator 
from Hamilton, New York, who was admitted to the bar in 1886. 
He became a member of a law firm in Auburn and soon took an 
interest in Republican politics. He was successively city 
clerk, supervisor and district attorney of Cayuga County in 
the 70's and from 1883 to 19l~was a member of Congress, with 
the exception of the 50th Congress. Mr. Payne was prominent 
in all tariff legislation during his time in Congress. 
The Ways and Means Committee contained Sereno E. Payne, 
chairman, John Dalzell, Samuel McCall, Ebenezer J. Hill, Henry 
s. Boutell, James C. Needham, William A. Calderhead, Joseph W. 
Fordney, Joseph H. Gaines, Nicholas Longsworth, Edgar D. 
Crumpacker, Francis w. Cushman, Champ Clark, Oscar w. Underwood 
James M. Griggs, Edward W. Pou, Choice B. Randell, Robert F. 
Broussard, Francis B. Harrison, and William K. Payne, clerk. 
The hearings or the House Ways and Means Committee for 
two years before the tariff bill was introduced, embraced the 
following points.l 
1. What particular rates of duty were higher than was 
1curtiss, Industrial Development, 374. 
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necessary to afford adequate protection, and to ascertain the 
extent to which they were unnecessary, in order that a reduc-
tion might be made? 
2. What particular existing duties were below the pro-
tective point, and the extent to which they should be increased 
in order to maintain the proper degree of protection? 
An exhaustive investigation was made by this committee, 
for they examined manufacturers representing all the various 
branches of industry. The men on the Ways and Means Committee 
heard evidence, and from these industrial magnates, on the cost 
of domestic production, the rates of wages, the development and 
condition of industries, and many other urgent and relevant 
phases of the subject. An inquiry was also made into the ex-
port prices of commodities and rates of wages in foreign coun-
tries as compared with the United State's prices. In the his-
tory of tariff legislation, no one committee of Congress ever 
devoted more time and labor to the preparation of a customs 
act. The investigation was the most accurate, exhaustive, and 
instructive ever conducted under the direction of Congress. 
On March 17, 1909, Sereno E. Payne, chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, reported the bill to the House of 
Representatives. He introduced it as a bill to promote reve-
nue, equalize duties, and encourage the industries of the 
United States. It was intended to lighten the burden so far as 
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possible of the people of our land. The bill was scrutinized 
according to the Republican acquiescence of the "true prin-
ciplei• idea. Mr. Payne denounced protective men who tried to 
revise the tariff rates to meet the difference of cost abroad. 
Some gentlemen think in order to be protec-
tionists that after they have found out the dif-
ference here and the cost abroad they ought to 
put on double that difference by way of a tar-
iff rate ••• I believed we should fix these 
duties as nearly as we can at the difference2be-tween the cost here and the ·cost abroad ••• 
Mr. Payne debated the bill on that basis as the country 
was overwhelmingly in favor of a protective tariff because it 
was an American policy, and it was necessary to have an im-
med~ate revision of our revenue laws. The people of the coun-
\ 
try from 1860 to 1909 had stood only for such duties as would 
produce needed revenue and would give industries, which were 
trying to prove their ability to exist in the United States, 
protection through a l~mited period. 
A minimum and maximum tariff was provided in the House 
Committee's bill, and was a protective tariff built on the 
lines of the Republicans' platform. It was designed to pro-
tect United States industries in their dealings with foreign 
countries, and free the businesses from any unfair competition 
from foreign sources. It provided the minimum tariff for any 
2con~ressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Special Session, 
v. 4, 7· 
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foreign country which did not discriminate against the United 
States, but if foreign countries did not give this country an 
equal chance, they would receive the maximum tariff rates of 
duty. On March 24th, Representative Champ Clark of Missouri, 
opposed the bill on the grounds that it raised the Dingley 
rates.3 Oscar w. Underwood of Alabama, Morris Sheppard of 
I 
Texas, Ollie M. James of Kentucky, and William Sulzer of New 
York, opposed the bill on the grounds that it was injurious to 
domestic and foreign trade.4 Those in favor of the Payne bill 
declared it to be in accordance with the Republican party's 
pledges and containing an excellent set of tariff schedules 
which were necessary for revenue and conditions in the United 
States. 
Representative Samue~ McCall of ~~ssachusetts supported 
the bill with this statement: 
Whether you agree or disagree to the par-
ticular provisions of the bill, there can be 
no question in the mind of any man who has 
made in any detail a study of its provisions 
that it revises the Tariff downward; that it 
makes some great and many important reduc-
tions from existing duties. • .s 
Despite active debate for and against the bill, no great 
3Miller, Revenue, 386. 
4Ibid., 386-9. 
5congressional Record, Volume 44, Part I, 759. Also 6lst 
Congress, 75. Also Miller, Revenue, 391. 
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changes were made in the House bill when it was discussed. 
This thesis is pot intended to go into full detail of the tar-
iff bill itself, and, for that reason, I have eliminated all 
references to the various rates of duties which were either 
raised or lowered by the Congress. Suffice it to say that the 
Payne bill put wood pulp, hides, iron ore, and flax on the free 
list, reduced the duties on steel and iron, lumber, and various 
manufactures by some 50%; made lesser cuts on the duties on re-
fined sugar and chemicals; admitted the products of the Philip-
pines free of duty, with limitations on the amount of' sugar and 
tobacco; and laid a progressive tax on inheritances.6 On the 
other hand, there were a good many increases purely for the 
sake of protection, while some articles (tea and cacao, for 
example) were taken from the free list to swell revenue. In 
spite of the hot debate regarding these duties, the Payne Bill, 
which was passed by the House of Representatives, was sub-
stantially that which was prepared by the Ways and Means Com-
mittee. Various sections of the country tried 11 log-rolling 11 in 
order to obtain their desired rates, and this brought protest 
from within the Republican party. The bill finally was voted 
upon in the House, and was passed April 9 by the votes of 215 
Republicans and 2 Democrats against 160 Democrats and 1 Repub-
6 Muzzey, American Adventure, 487. 
r 
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lican.7 It was an honest attempt to reduce the Dingley sched-
ules along the lines of the party's understanding if' not defi-
nite promises. It was sent to the Senate where it was referred 
to the Committee on Finance. 
In the Senate it was a different story, for history had 
shown that it is the Senate's influence on legislation that has 
the greater ef!'ect and are in favor of higher tariff duties. 
Because of its small and compact body, no State can be ignored 
and "log-rolling" was rampant here. In order to give certain 
States their desired concessions, others must be conciliated. 
The Senators from the agrarian States of the ~.Udd.Le West stood 
staunchly for a general reduction in duties of the tariff. The 
loca.l interests here were made more effective by the expert 
leadership of Senator Nelson Aldrich, a protectionist, who had 
the Republicans well organized. 
Nelson w. Aldrich was an American politician from Foster, 
Rhode Island. Hie first politica.l service was as a member 
(1869-1875) and president (1871-1872) of the Providence common 
counci.l. He was a member of the lower house of the Rhode 
Island legislature in 1875-.1876, and speaker in the last named 
year. By this time he had become very inr.Luential in Repub-
7congreeaional Record, Volume 44, Part 2, 1301. Curtiss, In-
austrial Development, 376. Also Miller, Revenue, 391. Ed-
ward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1891 to 1916, 
Mifflin, New York, 1912, 219. 
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lican state politics, and in 1878 and again in 1880 was elected 
to Congress. In 1881 he resigned to take a seat in the Senate, 
where he served continuously for thirty years. He was an able 
champion of protection and an authority on finance, and his 
knowledge of these subjects was embodied in various tariff and 
currency enactments. From 1881 on until he retired thirty 
years later, he was the master of Rhode Island politics. 8 In 
the Senate he was promptly recognized as a coming man and soon 
proved himself to be a brilliant statesman.9 In the 1897 and 
1909 tariff debates, Senator Aldrich stood not so much for 
protection in and of itself as for the status guo.10 
Senator Aldrich kept the bill in the finance committee for 
forty-eight hours, while the corridors around his committee 
room were crowded with the representatives of the big protected 
interests. When the bill emerged, it bore little resemblance 
to its original form. The Senator's influence accounts for no 
less than 847 substantially important amendments, whose ten-
dency was upward. Many greatly debated articles in the House 
were again subjected to a raise. It is certain that the shift-
ing of duties would embody "jokers"--new rates favoring par-
8Allan Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, Scrib-
ner's, New York, 1928, 152. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid., 154. 
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ticular industries. 11 As a result the bill was a complicated 
affair which needed careful study in order to be understood. 
Many months of hearings went into the work of the bill. 
It was reported to the Senate on April 19, 1909, where it was 
debated at great length. Senator Aldrich led the active de-
bate on the various points in the tariff bill. With the help 
of the other Senators, he was able to raise the rates; this 
stimulated the discussion all the more. Senator Aldrich pro-
posed to "railroad" it through the Senate by making it the 
sole order of business until it was passed. Instead of laying 
before the members the customary written explanations for the 
changes in the bill, with recommendations for a reasonable 
time for discussion, he secured the order that the bill should 
be taken up immediately, and discussed daily until it was 
voted upon favorably. The alleged reason for this arbitrary 
procedure was that the business interests of the country were 
suffering from uncertainty as to the government's tariff 
policy. 12 The real reason probably was that the tariff reform-
ers might not have time to make a careful study of the bill.l3 
But the reformers were not daunted, as will be shown 
later. Heated arguments developed over the Republican party 
11Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 365. 
~2~~zzey, American Adventure, 488. 
l3Ibid. 
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pledges between the various Senators and Mr. Aldrich. Joseph 
W. Bailey of Texas stated that if the tariff were raised it 
would not be keeping the promise to the American people to re-
vise the tariff in the interest of the consumer.l4 Aldrich 
felt bound to revise the tariff from a protective standpoint, 
and to make the rates equal the difference in the cost of pro-
duction here and abroad, plus a reasonable profit. The Repub-
lican party held the commission of the American public to re-
vise the Dingley Act upon these lines. Mr. Aldrich, on this 
fact, stated: "I believe that that policy is the only correct 
policy for ~he people of the United States to adopt and to 
maintain."15 The bill, as a whole, contained large reductions 
below the existing law and a few increases in present rates, 
according to Senator Aldrich. 
At this point, Insurgent reaction was felt, ably led by 
Senator La Follette, who interrupted Senator Aldrich's plans by 
a prolonged debate which revealed to the country exactly what 
was going on.. Well assisted, La Follette studied the bill by 
night and debated it by day. The Insurgents were, however, un-
able to prevent its passage despite their active aggression to 
the measure. They hopelessly fought it every step of the way. 
They were denounced by the "Old Guard,". and there was a great 
l4The 6lst Congress, 147. 
15rbid. 
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deal of talk about reading them out of the party. This reactio 
will not be discussed here but in a later chapter. 
The Payne bill did reduce the schedules in a number of in-
stances and was an honest effort to carry out the party's poli-
cies, bu~ it was not this way in the Senate. There was a gen-
eral revision downward but not enough to satisfy President Taft 
and his desires which were more than the Senate desired. While 
the bill was being written and rewritten in Congress, the Pres-
ident was carefully observing the maneuvers of the legislators 
with growing apprehension. Frequently he threatened to veto 
the bill in order to daunt the reactionaries and obtain one in 
compliance with the platform. Taft approached the Insurgents 
because he wanted them to fight for a downward revision of the 
tariff bill. With the tariff question nearing its final 
stages, the President's responsibility for its ultimate form 
grew acute. The whole country looked to him to 11 exert all his 
authority and influence, to instigate the Conference Committee 
of Congress, to acquiesce to a bill which he could honorably 
sign, and which the peop~e would not regard as a betrayal or a 
mockery to his promises.ul6 
The Senate Bill put iron ore and flax back on the tax 
schedules, duties on steel and iron ore and agricultural prod-
~6Elmer More, Ed., "Nearing the Tariff End," The Nati..Qg, 
Volume 89, N. Y. Evening Post, N. Y., 1909. 
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ucts were restored, and the inheritance tax was omitted. The 
Senate passed the bill, with many amendments made by the 
Finance Committee, on July 8, 1909, by a vote of 45 to 34. 17 
There were a total of more than 600 decreases and 200 increases 
over the Dingley Tariff. These rates were a compromise between 
the Dingley figures and the Payne figures. The Conference Com-
mittee was appointed, consisting of' eight members from each 
house, 5 Republicans and 3 Democrats. The Administration 
brought pressure to bear in favor of the House rates after the 
bill was sent to this committee as these rates were lower than 
the Senate rates. 
The President had refrained from any serious effort to in-
fluence the course of the legislation up to this point. The 
bill that emerged from the Committee of July 30 was a complete 
betrayal to his campaign promises. It did provide for more de-
creases than increases in the duties, but the'decreases were 
rarely on items of significance, and far more important duties 
were left untouched than were changed. Under the new law, the 
average rates on dutiable goods were 1% higher than under the 
Tariff of 1897· Of a total of 2,024 items in that law, there 
were 654 decreases, 220 increases, and 1,115 were left un-
17congressional Record, Volume 44, Part 4, 4316. Also Miller, 
Revenue, 391. Also William s. Myers, The Republican Party, 
Century, New York, 1931, 392. Also Stanwood, ~· cit., 219. 
Also Muzzey, American People, 573. 
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touched.i8 This new law, considered from every point of view, 
revised the Dingley Law only slightly downward. 
President Taft could not influence Senator Aldrich who was 
a high tariff man. He desired a protective tariff which would 
equalize conditions of production and distribution between this 
country and other competing countries. He was the strong 
political lea.der of the Republican party in the Senate. Taft 
and Aldrich held many conferences in private and the contents 
were not published; therefore, we do not know what was said 
between the two politicians, but we do know that his efforts 
were to no avail as the bill as it was passed was an Aldrich 
victory. President Taft had tried to obtain a better bill by 
encouraging the Insurgents, but joined the conservative majori-
ty when a split was threatened in the party. In order to 
frighten the high tariff people, he threatened to veto the 
measure. If he had vetoed the bill, the Republican party 
would have been split sooner and would have brought dissension 
and ruin into it. He also would have arrayed the majority of 
his party against him, and it would not have removed the un-
certainty which the business community considered the worst 
phase of the situation. 
As has been shown by the Table, there were 220 instances 
186lst Congress, 17. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 
377. Also Muzzey, ~· cit. Also Bassett, The United States 
1492-i920, 572. 
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TABLE OF SCHEDULES 
Items Changes in Dingley Un-
SCHEDULES in Law bv Pavne Law changed 
~ingley De- In- Total Items 
Law creaseecreaseeChangee 
A. Chemicals, oils, etc •••• 232 
B. Earths, earthen and 
glass ware. . . . . . . . • • • • • 170 
c. Metals, :Manufactures of. 321 
D. Wood, Manufactures of... 35 
E. Sugar, molasses, and 
manufactures of........ 38 
~. Tobacco, and manu-
factures of............ 8 
G. Agri. products and 
provisions •.••••••••••• 187 
~. Spirits, wines, etc..... 33 
I. Cotton manufactures ••.•• 261 
J. Flax, hemp, jute, manu-
factures of •••••••••••• 254 
~· Wool, and manufactures 
81 
46 
185 
18 
2 
0 
14 
4 
28 
187 
22 
12 
30 
3 
0 
0 
19 
23 
47 
4 
103 
58 
215 
21 
2 
0 
33 
27 
75 
191 
129 
112 
106 
14 
8 
154 
6 
186 
63 
of ••••••••••••••••••••• 78 3 0 3 75 
L. Silk and silk goods ••••• 78 21 31 52 26 
M. Pulp, papers, and books. 59 11 9 20 29 
~ • Sund r i e s • • • . . •••••••••• ·~2~m~o;..,.__r-,~5;-r·4_t-=.;;:2~0--+--=~ 74 --+--::--?19~'6=---t 
TOTAL •.•.••••••• 2024 654 220 874 1150 
To be found in Curtiss, Industrial Development, 377. Also 
~1st Congress, 8. 
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in which duties were increased. 19 In very few cases the duties 
were increased for the purpose of securing protection to our 
industries, but principally to increase the revenues. The re-
vision of the tariff was entered upon and carried through ac-
cording to the ideas of the Bresident, although the reductions 
in duties were not carried to the extent which he desired. 
It soon became apparent that the movement in the West in 
favor of some kina of income taxation had become exceedingly 
strong. As earLy as April 15, 1909, Senator Joseph W. Bailey 
of Texas had moved an amendment for a general income tax, at 
the rate of 3% of incomes over $5000. 20 Six days later, 
Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa proposed a graduated income 
tax on all incomes over $5000, the rates ranging from two up to 
six percent on all incomes over $100,000. 21 These two amend-
mente were later on consolidated, and became known as the 
Bailey-Cummins amendment. A strong desire arose in the House 
in April, 1909, to embody in the generaL tariff bill a resolu-
tion concerning an income tax provision that could not be con-
strued by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 
L9ALso 61st Congress, 8. Also Curtiss, Industrial Development, 
377. 
20congressional Record, Volume 44, Part 2, 1351. Also Edwin 
R. A. SeLigman, The Income Tax, Macmillan, New York, 1911, 
592. 
2lcongressional Record, VoLume 44, Part 2, 1420. Also Selig-
man, .Q.E • cit • , 59 2 • 
It was discarded as impractical, as no matter how the tax pro-
vision might be formulated, the Supreme Court would declare it 
unconstitutional. The Senate, however, had discussed it from 
the standpoint of an amendment which would decide its constitu-
tionality. A general discussion ensued in which the progres-
sives of both parties spoke in favor of an income tax. The 
strength which the income-tax proposition developed alarmed 
the Republican leaders considerably. 
When the inheritance tax provision was dropped, very 
largely because of the opposition to the various states, an at-
tempt was made to placate the insurgents by agreeing to enact 
at once a tax on corporate incomes, and to couple with this the 
submission of an income-tax amendment to the states. President 
Taft declared his conversion on June 16, 1909, when he stated: 
Although I have not considered a constitu-
tional amendment as necessary to the exercise 
of certain phases of this power (to tax in-
comes), a mature consideration has satisfied 
me that an amendment is the only proper course 
for its establishment to its full extent. I 
therefore recommend that both Houses • • • 
shall propose an amendment to the constitution, 
conferring the power to levy an income tax upon 
the national government wi~~out an apportion-
ment among the states. • • . 
The program was accordingly carried out as the Senate 
passed a resolution, by a vote of 77 to 0, on July 5. 23 The 
593· 
Recorg, Volume 44, Part 4, 4121. Also ~!iller, 
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House referred the resolution to the Committee on Ways and 
Means, which reported it back on July 12. The bill passed the 
House on July 12, 1909, by a vote of' 318 to 14.24 
The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act authorized an excise tax of 
one percent on incomes above $5000 of all corporations organ-
ized for profit. It was to yield a considerable revenue, but 
its greatest importance was that it recognized the principle 
that Congress could tax the great corporations. There was a 
general desire among the followers of both political parties 
to add an income tax, if only partial in its application, to 
the government's revenue resources. The hostility to trusts 
and large corporations gave this proposal popular support. It 
was opposed by the House Ways and Means Committee on the 
grounds that the taxation of corporations belonged primarily 
to the states; that it discriminated against the corporate 
form of' business in favor of' the partnership; that it intro-
duced rigorous examination of corporations' accounts; and that 
being a direct tax it was unconstitutional. 25 The Supreme 
Court upheld the measure as constitutional. The tax on this 
opened up a new revenue system. The corporation tax or special 
24congressional Record, Volume 44, Part 4, 4440. Also Miller, 
Revenue, 427. 
25navis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 
(American Citizen Series), 9th Ed., Longmans, Green, New 
York, 1924, 486. 
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excise tax is an income tax, and was the first tax of this 
type in the United States. 
Provisions concerning the maximum and minimum tariff ar-
rangement appeared in.the final bill. These were simple. The 
stated tariff rates were declared to be the minimum tariff of 
the United State~ to these rates 25% was to be added on goods 
coming from foreign countries which unduly discriminated 
against the United States. The minimum tariff plus this 25% 
constituted the maximum tariff. The administration of this 
system was entirely in the hands of the President for it was 
he who was to decide who was unduly discriminating against the 
United States. 
The bill was reluctantly passed by the House on July 31 by 
a vote of 195 to 183 even though Mr. Payne reported it favor-
ably.26 The Senate approved it on August 5 by a vote of 47 to 
31.27 It was signed by President Taft on the same day and was 
effective immediately. 
The Payne-Aldrich Law in many respects is very much like 
the act of 1883, and was prepared and enacted in a state of 
public opinion very similar to that prevailing when the re-
vision was made after the report of the Tariff Commission of 
26Miller, Revenue, 407. Also :Muzzey, American Adventure, 488. 
Also Muzzey, American People, 573. 
27Ibid. Also Stanwood, ~· cit., 219. 
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1882. While it did not overthrow the substantial principles of 
the protective policy, it was a yielding to a political influ-
ence and to a popular sentiment existing in certain parts of 
the country which were demanding a downward revision. The 
measure was enacted in response to a sentiment which discredit-
ed the protective system. Such yielding gives encouragement to 
and incites the activity of the opposition. The law did divide 
rather than unite the Republican party. Its reductions were 
very slight and it made a large portion of the people think 
little could be hoped from the policy of revising the tariff by 
its friends. In signing the law, President Taft thought he had 
taken the lesser of the two evils, but he soon found that the 
Insurgents, as the Western men now began to be called, were 
capable of severe hostility. They were not numerous, but by 
combining with the Democrats, they could make much trouble for 
the Taft administration. 
CHAPTER IV 
REACTIONS TO THE TARIFF 
The Tariff Act of 1909 brought no vital change in the tar-
iff system of our country. It still left an excessively high 
scheme of rates, and showed an extremely intolerant position on 
foreign trade. This law introduced into the tariff policy of 
the United States, :!:'or the first time in its history, the sys-
tem of maximum and minimum rates of duties. As will be shown, 
it did not go far enough in reducing the tariff to satisfy the 
Democratic party, the Insurgent Republicans, or those interests 
whlch had been endeavoring to secure special favors for them-
selves. Many farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and free 
t.raders joined in a crusade of misrepresentation of the Payne-
Aldrich Law and 9f the protective system.l The Democrats de-
veloped the slogan that the tariff should be revised to reduce 
the still high cost of living. Many business men and capital-
ists were prejudiced against the Republican party by the vari-
ous new taxes in the new tariff. The revision of the tariff 
seemed to the corn wheat growers more serviceable to the manu-
facturers and other urban interests and to the wool growers 
than to the farmers of the Mid-West. Hot debate broke out as 
1curtiss, Industrial Development, 540. 
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to whether the tariff had been revised upward or downward, and 
neither wing of the Republican Party was satisfied with the 
results. The urban interests desired lower rates on food and 
raw materials while the agrarian interests demanded lower rates 
on clothing, farm equipment and supplies. The wool growers 
and cattlemen wanted ample protection for their products. The 
people of the United States were entirely ignored; but, it was 
said, they cannot long be ignored, as they will make themselves 
felt. 2 The reconciliation of these diverse interests was too 
great a task for the Taft administration. 
The ~evision of the tariff was entered upon and carried 
through in conformity with the ideas of the Repubiican party, 
although the reductions in duties were not carried to the ex-
tent which President Taft desired. He had interpreted the 
platform upon which he was elected, as pledging the party to a 
downward revision. It yielded to a poll tical int'luence and to 
a popular sentiment existing in the Middle west which were de-
manding this. It was a yieiding to opposing forces and influ-
ences with the hope of preventing further agitation for a re-
duction or the tariff. In this respect the measure had been 
disappointing. Instead of peace and contentment, the enemies 
or American industries were excited to greater activity, and 
2Lyman Abbott, ed., "The Tariff," Outlook, v. 92, Outlook, New 
York, August 6, 1909, 654. 
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the whole question was reopened. The business of the country 
was seriously affected by this new outburst. 
Some disappointments over the tariff's outcome were that 
the cost or living continued to rise, trusts, and larger cor-
porations appeared to be controlling prices with a firmer grip 
of monopoly, and the consumer felt that he had been sacrificed 
to the interest of the producer.3 The West was 11 outepoken 
about the shame and cheats that were left in the tariff, and 
urged a continuance of the fight to have the frauds removed."4 
The tariff law was denounced as a betrayal of the people and 
as a breach of the President's pledge, and it was felt that he 
could not pronounce it satisfactory • 
• • • Its reception by the press. is at best a 
defamation with faint praise. With public 
opinion eo mixed and eo heated, a calm and 
fair review of' what has been done, and what 
was left undone, is more than called for. 
It is only Just to admit that the President's 
insistence did wring something from the high-
tariff extortionists ••• 5 
Conf'licting opinion makes it difficult to draw any conclusions 
as to the law's effectiveness or inadequateness. There was 
3navis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 
(American Citizen Series), 9th ed., Longmans, Green, N.y., 
1924, 488. 
~lmer More, ed., "Attitude of the West," The Nation, Volume 
89, New york Evening Post, N. Y. 
SElmer More, ed., "The Tariff Outcome," Nation, Volume 89, 
New York Evening Post, New York, August 5, 1909, 112. 
70 
marked Republican disapproval over its passage and the Party 
was doomed if they did not reduce the tariff further. The 
many duties in the bill had various backers and attackers 
throughout the country and in Congress. 
While the bill was being debated in the House, the people 
were very much in favor of it. The New York Daily Tribune 
carried an editorial showing the favorable attitude of the 
peo;>le: 
••• hopeful foundation for constructive legis-
lation ••• It should prove of highest advantage 
to the whole country ••• It is not a radical 
measure ••• It is the result of an honest ef-
fort to fulfill the6pledges made by the Re-publican party ••• 
This paper also stated: "It is an American policy and it 
seems to be acquiesced in by the greater majority of the Ameri-
can people. u'7 Naturally there were arguments adverse to the 
tariff bill which declared it to be too drastic and deceptive. 
These, too, could be found in the New York Daily Tribune, 
which stated: 
••• today scarcely anyone could be met who did 
not have complaint or some suggestion to make. 
The Democrats seemed to have spent. the night 
in an attempt to discover 'jokers' in the 
measure, and although they insist that they 
have found many iniquitous provisions, they 
have thus far advanced no cri\icisms which do 
not emanate from purely local announcing of 
6New York Daily Tribune, March 19, 1906, p. 6, editorial. 
This paper has always been a high tariff paper. 
7Ibid. 
their intentions of tryin§ to have the bill 
changed in numerous ways. 
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The President signed the bill for the sake of its good 
features while admitting that it was not in complete compli-
ance with the promises made. Theodore Roosevelt thought that 
the present tariff was "better than the last; and considerably 
better than the last; and considerably better than the one be-
fore the last; but it has certainly failed to give general 
satisfaction."9 In spite of these dissenting opinions, it 
was a sincere effort on the part of the Republicans to revise 
the tariff downward, and to comply with the promises of the 
platform as they had been generally understood. 10 
Taft believed that the people would approve of the tariff 
if only they could be made to understand it. So he made a 
tour of the country to rehabilitate himself with his western 
critics. He traveled 16,000 miles and spoke repeatedly to 
large, but unenthusiastic, crowds. At Winona, Minnesota, he 
made a speech defending the tariff and blundered politically 
by insisting that it was the best tariff bill the Republicans 
had ever passed. In the Winona speech on September 17, 1909, 
·s Ibid., March 23, 1909, p. 2. 
9Ibid., March 19, 1909, p. 1. Also Theodore Roosevelt, "The 
Tariff: A Moral Issue," The Outlook, Volume 96, Outlook, 
New York, September, 1909, 102 • 
..lOLym~n Abbott, ed., "The Payne Tariff Law, 11 The Outlook, 
Volume 92, Outlook, New York, August, 1909, 862. 
President Taft stated: 
I am bound to say that I think the Payne 
Tariff bill is the best tariff bill that the 
Republican party ever passed; that in it the 
party has conceded the necessity for follow-
ing the changed conditions and reducing tar-
iff rates accordingly. This is a substantial 
achievement in the direction of lower tariffs 
and downward revision, and it ought to be ac-
cepted as such. • .I believe that the inter-
ests of the country, the interests of the 
party, required me to sacrifice the accom-
plishments of certain things in the revision 
of the tariff which I had hoped for, in or-
der to maintain party solidarity, which I be-
lieve to be much more important than the re-
duction of rates in one or two schedules of 
the tariff ••• This is the best tariff bill 
that the Republican party has ever passed, 
and therefore the best r!riff bill that has 
been passed at all ••• 
The audience was convinced that he had violated their 
72 
trust in him. Mr. Taft believed that the people would approve 
if only they could be made to understand, so he gave the fol-
lowing reasons for signing the law: 
••• where would the country have been had 
the bill been vetoed, or been lost by a vote? 
It would have left the question of the re-
vision of the tariff open for further dis-
cussion during the next session. It would 
have suspended the settlement of all our 
business down to a known basis upon which 
prosperity could proceed and investments be 
made, and it would have held up the coming 
of prosperity to this country, certainly for 
a year and probably longer. • .It contained 
provisions of the utmost importance in deal-
ing with foreign countries and in the supply-
11The 6lst Congress, 12-14. Also Curtiss, Industrial Develop-
ment-;-oDo. 
ing of a deficit which under the Dingley bill 
seemed inevitable ••• 12 
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Despite President Taft's able support of the new law, the 
people found errors in his defense of the tariff which prevent-
ed them from accepting his conclusions. So it was evident that 
relatively few people were really contented with it; many, 
especially in the West, were thoroughly dissatisfied with it. 
In an article by Harrison Smalley, he stated that many people 
were "antagonized by what they considered his ungrateful con-
duct toward the insurgents, without whose devoted courage, not 
even the President could have prevented the tariff from being 
higher."13 If Taft had adhered to hie principles of a lower 
tariff, and had directed his influence of the Administration 
against further amendments, it is doubtful that the Democratic 
party would have had the courage to renew its assaults on our 
industries. The country, then, would have accepted the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff as a full compliance with even President Taft's 
interpretation of the Republican platform. 
Periodical literature of the day revealed the reactions of 
the people and editors to the new tariff. No previous Repub-
lican tariff ever passed with such marked Republican dieapprov 
12The 6lst Congress, 14-15. 
13Harrison s. Smalley, "The People and the New Tariff," The 
Independent, v. 67, N. Y., November 11, 1909, 1087. 
stamped upon it.l4 
The bilL which passed the House on July 31, 
1909, even the President's optimism is unequal 
to pronouncing satisfactory; and the formidable 
opposition of Republicans in House, despite the 
strongest party pressure, with the continuing 
hostility of Western Republican Senators, shows 
how far the measure is from meeting the demand 
of the people.l5 · 
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The North American Review carried an article written by 
Woodrow Wilson who called the tariff make-believe, and stated: 
••.• it is miscellaneously wrong in detail and 
radically wrong in principle. It disturbs 
more than it settles, and by. its very failure 
to settle forces the question forwi~ into a 
new and much more acute stage ••• 
Another source of dissenting comment came from another well 
known periodical which compared the law's passage with the com-
ing Congressional elections, stated: 
••• the dissatisfactions which have been 
caused by a readjustment of the tariff sched-
ules and the acrimonious debates which marked 
the consideration of the measure in the Sen-
ate would still be fresh in the public mind 
this fall. If the country is satisfied and 
prosperous, the Republicans will have little 
difficulty in retaining control. At any rate 
the campaign will be fought upon the issue of 
l4George Harvey, ed., The North American Review, editorial, 
Volume 190, North American Review, New York, S~ptember, 1909, 
428. 
1~1mer More, ed., "The Tariff Outcome," .TI!! Nation, Volume 89, 
New York Evening Post, New York, August 5, 1909, 112. 
16 ttThe Tariff Make-Believe," The North American Review, 
Volume 190, North American Review, New York, October, 1909, 
535. 
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the actual operation of the new law ••• 17 
Reactions to the corporation tax were to be divided into 
two classes: 1) Those which turned upon the objection to any 
inspection of business, and 2) those which turned upon the ob-
jection that the tax would rest upon business inequitably. It 
was the opponents of the bill that were furnishing the best 
arguments on its behalf; because it was they who for the 
first time showed how deep set and significant were the in-
equalities present in our industrial system. The prime duty of 
the Republicans in Congress during this special session was to 
see that the tariff was honestly and materially revised down-
ward. According to an editorial by Lyman Abbott, the advan-
tages of the corporation tax were: 
••• 1) it is direct and straightforward method 
of raising revenue. Although the tax is not 
laid upon individuals, it is laid where it will 
be felt. 2) This tax is just, in that it is 
imposed on owners of property. 3) This tax is 
desirable because it affords one means for 
Federal control of corporations. A Federal 
excise tax on c·orporations is thus sound in 
principle; it can be made practical of appli-
cation; and it is likely to be effective as 
one measure of s!§uring a just industrial and 
political order. 
Elmer More who was quite dissatisfied with the new tariff 
17Frederic T. Cooper, ed., "The Tariff and the Next Campaign," 
~ Forum, Volume 42, Forum, New York, September, 1909, 195 • 
.J.8"The Corporation Excise Tax, 11 The Outlook, Volume 92, Outlook, 
New York, June 26, 1909, 431. ---
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schedules felt equally as adverse to the new excise tax which 
was included in the bill. He seemed to feel that despite all 
the care taken in drawing it up, would not "prevent it from 
·provoking a great amount of' litigation, to say nothing of 
trickery and fraud.nl9 The corporation tax amendment to the 
tariff bill was to Mr. More: 
• • .in outward seeming, a mild-mannered affair 
••• looks very harmless ••• But it is evident 
that the framers of the tax grew a little. timid 
of getting too much revenue, as of too much pub-
licity, and also dre~8ed annoying and offending 
too many people ••• 
The Dingley bill had a solid Republican vote in the Sen-
ate.21 According to an editorial in the North American Review: 
"Nothing so significant and so ominous as the unbending re-
sistance now of!'ered by the Progressive Republican Senators 
from the MidWest has ever before attended the passage of a 
high tariff bill."22 Unless something was done to conciliate 
the Republicans of the midwest, disaster to the Republican 
party was sure to foiiow. 23 The party, it was said, would 
19"The Corporation Tax," The Nation, Volume 89, New York 
Evening Post, New York, Julyl, 1909, 1. 
20Ibid. 
21The North American Review, Volume 190, North American Review, 
New York, September, 1909, 428. 
22rbid. 
23Ib1d. Also Elmer More, "The UnsettLed Tariff," The NationA. 
me 89, New York Evening Post, New York, Augu~12, 190~, 
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never win the next eiection if it did not correct this new tar-
iff which was so unsatisfactory to both parties and to the 
American people. The special session of the 6lst Congress 
wouid have been a failure if it had not been for the Insur-
gents. President Taft signed the bill because it was the best 
he could obtain, and he would not have been just if he had held 
up the business of the country for months by a veto, on the 
chance of obtaining a better tariff bili. 
The country received the Act with outspoken condemnation. 
Depressed, cynical, sneering comments were heard on all sides. 
Miss Ida Tarbeli commented: 
Congress went home anything but proud of 
itself. Here was a piece of legislation which 
had cost the entire time of a large body of 
iegislators f'or more than a year, to which an 
extra five months session or Congress had been 
given, and from it n~body carried away any en-
thusiasm, pride, a sense of triumph--nothing 
but a disagreeable, coppery taste of barter and 
juggiery ••• The only satisfaction was ~~e 
negative one that at ieast it was over.~ 
Still there were some redeeming features in the bill; those of 
the corporation tax, and tne Customs Court. It consisted or 
five judges to equalize and expedite the machinery of the as-
sessment and collection of duties by declaring all appeals from 
the board of appraisers. 25 It provided for a tariff board to 
24rda M. Tarbell, The Tariff in Our !imes, Macmillan, New York, 
1912, 327. 
25Muzzey, American Adventure, 490. 
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study the schedules, primarily for the purpose of aiding the 
President in applying the maximum and minimum rates, and in-
cidentally to furnish material useful in further revisions of 
the tariff. 26 
It was a striking illustration of the change in pub~ic 
sentiment in the first decade of the nineteenth century. To 
this sentiment the national government had been unresponsive. 
Professor Ogg stated that: 
••• Congress had missed a great opportunity, 
the President had failed to rise to the level 
of statesmanship expected from him ••• 27 
The Payne Aldrich Act was the wooden horse of Troy, 
dragged joltingly through the gate of the Republican citadel as 
the talisman of the divinity of high protection.28 The sig-
nificant thing, after all, about the Tariff of 1909, said Mr. 
Muzzey, was that a bill could be branded as a shameful betrayal 
of the people, as it certainly was no worse and probably better 
than the Dingley Law; and that the person who signed such a 
bill, instead of enjoying an increasing measure of confidence, 
like Mr. McKinley, could be condemned for having forfeited his 
claims to leadership.29 
26rbid. 
27rbid. 
28rbid. 
29rbid. 
CHAPTER V 
INSURGENT OPPOSITION 
The promise of a downward revision of the tariff divided 
the Republican party into two hostile camps. The aim of the 
Insurgents was to carry out what Theodore Roosevelt had termed 
as nmy policies.u The hotbed of Insurgency was in the agrarian 
states of Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, North 
and South Dakota, Indiana, and some New England and Pacific 
Coast States. 1 These states protested the high or discriminat-
ing features of the tariff and were in decided favor of a much 
greater reduction of the duties. President Taft encouraged 
them in the hope that they would obtain a better bill, but gave 
up the idea rather than cause a party split. The great service 
rendered by the Progressives was a clean-cut, straightforward 
fight for a principle in which the insurgents firmly believed, 
that of a downward revision of the tariff. 
Among the insurgents in the House, there was no organized 
opposition to the Payne bill before it was passed on April 9, 
1909. There was, however, individual attacks of particular 
schedules by various Representatives. They made but a small 
1Kenneth w. Hechler, Insurgency, Personalities, and Politics of 
the Taft Era, Columbia, New York, 1940, 16. Hereafter this 
~k will be cited as Hechler, Insurgency. 
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contribution to the wave of resentment that greeted the passage 
of the bill. Although they looked upon the bill with some 
small amount of endurance at first, after a prudent study of 
its provisions they slowly became contrary to its terms. These 
men included George W. Norris of Nebraska whose entire career 
had been characterized by independence and was the leader of 
the House Insurgents. 2 Edmond H. Madison of Kansas fought 
shoulder to shoulder with the Insurgents.3 Victor Murdock of 
Kansas was the most spectacular and dynamic of these men who 
fought against the bill.4 John M. Nelson of Wisconsin was an 
outstanding personality who held the same philosophy as Senator 
LaFollette.5 Miles Poindexter of Washington added a great deal 
of moral strength to the Insurgents with his economic thinkin~6 
It was the fight on the Payne-Aldrich tariff which brought 
these men together with the Insurgent Senatore. 
Even before the Finance Committee of the Senate had com-
plated its delibera.tions on the Payne Bill, Joseph L. Bristow 
of Kansas decided that he would vote against the bill unless 
2Ibid., 33. Also James T. Adame, ed., Dictionary of American 
History, IV, Scribner's, New York, 1940, 356. 
~echler, Insurgency, 34-35· 
4Ibid., 37. Also Adams, .212• cit., 356. 
5Hechler, Insurgency, 36. 
6Ibid., 38. 
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some items were substantially lowered, and others placed on the 
free list. He carried the banner of progressivism in his news-
papers during the early 1900's.7 From the moment the bill was 
reported to the House in March, 1909, little knots of Western 
Senators began to meet and compare notes on the proposed tar-
iff. Apprehension arose about the effect which the pending 
provision might have upon the price for the consumer's goods. 
Jonathan P. Dolliver of Kansas had no background of in-
surgency but was a standpat conservative with this reaction in 
him which sprang into prominence when Insurgency came into its 
own in the Senate.8 He was seen spending a great deal of his 
time in the House listening to the debates on various points 
in the bill during March and April.9 Robert LaFollette of Wis-
consin was spending his every spare moment in his office, work-
ing hard to accumulate statistical ammunition for the forth-
coming battle.~0 He was the most outstanding leader of Pro-
gressivism in his own state and in the Senate. Albert J. 
Beveridge of Indiana was one of the best propagandists of the 
7Ibid., 88. 
8Ibid., 89. Also Adams, ~· cit., 356. Also Robert M. LaFol-
lette, LaFollette's Autobiography, LaFollette, Madison, Wis., 
1920, 435· 
9claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, Houghton 
Mifflin, New York, 1932, 338. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as Bowers, Beveridge. 
10Ibid. 
82 
Insurgent cause. 11 Albert B. Cummins of Iowa was the popular-
izer of the "Iowa Idea" which called for a regulation of cor-
porations and tariff reductions in rates that afforded a shel-
ter to monopoly. He was one of the most influential men 1n 
this insurgency and was a leader of the debates on the Income 
Tax amendment to the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill.12 Moses E. 
Clapp of Minnesota fell in line when the Insurgent battle 
started in the Senate. He was the least industrious as he took 
no active part in the debates. 13 These were the men who bore 
the brunt or the controversy and were the ones who had the 
temerity to challenge the authority of Senator Aldrich. They 
fought for a lower tariff at Taft's request, and Beveridge be-
gan the fruitless struggle in May.14 These so-ca~~ed insur-
gents formed an able and aggressive body of downward revision-
ists who favored a much lower reduction of duties than the 
Payne-Aldrich bill called for, and carried their opposition to 
an extent which surrounded its passage with great uncertainty. 
The insurgents divided the various schedules between them. 
Mr. Dolliver reviewed the woolen and cotton schedules and de-
11Hechler, Insurgency, 91. 
12Ibid., 87. 
13Ibid. , 85. 
14Bowers, Beveridge, 338. 
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nounced them as bad advertisements for the Republican party.l5 
He criticized Senator Aldrich for allowing tariff revision by 
manufacturers. Mr. Bristow worked on the lead and sugar sched-
ules lbd debated admirably on them. Mr. Cummine took the 
metals and glassware schedules and was in the debate daily 
rendering most excellent public service. 16 The indefatigable 
LaFollette familiarized himse~f with several of the schedules, 
eo as to have as complete a knowledge as possible. He launched 
a blasting attack upon the tariff on April 22, 1909.11 Mr. 
Beveridge confined himself to the general leadership in the 
parliamentary battles on the floor. 18 They prolonged the de-
bate for eleven weeks, hectoring the indignant Aldrich and ad-
vertising the injustice of many of the rates; but they could 
not hinder the Aldrich measure from passing the Senate July 8. 
Numerically the States from which the Republican defection 
comes are important, because they comprise sixty-two electoral 
votes in a Presidential election. But qualitatively they are 
also important because of their independence of judgment. 
Their opposition to a high tariff had been gallantly displayed 
~5Hechler, Insurgency, 108. Also Muzzey, American AdventureA88. 
l6Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette's Autobiography, LaFollette, 
Madison, Wisconsin, 1920, 444. Also, Muzzey, American Ad-
venture, 488. 
~7Hechler, Insurgency, 103. 
18Bowers, ~veridge, 339· 
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throughout the debates in the Senate. All kinds of pressure 
was brought to bear on the insurgents to make them yield. 
Considerable controversy arose as to whether President 
Taft directly asked any of the Insurgents to conduct their 
t"ight in the Senate f'or reductions in rates. At the outset, 
they felt they were doing him a favor by helping him to achieve 
his campaign pledge. According to LaFollette, the President 
told him to go ahead and criticize and amend the bill in the 
interest of reductions. 19 Senator Beveridge related that Mr. 
Dolliver was called to the White House and was asked to convey 
the news to the other Insurgents that a fight for a downward 
revision would be in good order.20 In view of President Taft's 
state of mind, it seems plausible that he did make such state-
ments. He was apprehensive lest Senator Aldrich failed to car-
ry out the party's platform, which he knew would happen because 
of Aldrich's ideas of tariffs. 
The history or reform in the United States is one or com-
plete failure for there are too many factors involved in the 
raising or the lowering or the tariff for Congress to do any-
thing. "It has been too often that of hopes deferred and 
hearts made sick," said Mr. More. 21 He continued: "In the 
19Hechler1 Insurgenct' 101. Also Bowers, Beveridge, LaFolle~te, ~· ci ., 440. 
20Hechler, Insurgency, 101. 
21Elmer More, 
York Evenin 
337 •. Also 
89, New 
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long warfare against this form or unscrupulous greed, many 
eyes have been opened.u22 President Taft was honest and sin-
cere in working for a tariff revision but how easily he prom-
ised what he was not able with arduous labor to perform. He 
found those in possession of the plunder too mighty for him. 
He owed it to the country and to those tariff reformers to 
make it clear that the fight against dishonest tariffs must go 
on. 
Alarmed over the insurgent revolt, Senator Aldrich and 
his group desired a speedy vote. But the ever persistent In-
surgents continually objected and debated the bill at great 
length. The President began to regret his request to them, 
for they were a compact fighting body battling for a downward 
revision. They had more than enthusiasm for the measure than 
did the rest of Congress. The Insurgents paraded their objec-
tions through the hot summer months of May, June, and July, and 
never once did they cease their relentless and ineffective ag-
gression against the prevailing high tariff provision. Gradu-
ally the skirmish neared its end with the Progressives still 
banded together on the amendments in futile opposition to the 
smooth functioning Aldrich machine. Time and time again they 
were whipped, but never once did they give up hope. The Payne-
Aldrich Tariff was characterized by one of the Insurgents in 
22Ibid. 
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the Senate as "the most outrageous assault of private interests 
on the people recorded in tariff history." 23 Senator Cummins 
stated that he believed the Republican voters of the United 
States would not "regard these duties as the fulfillment of the 
promises."24 Senator Dolliver could not support the measure 
because he was "opposed to the methods by which it has been 
prepared."25 
The revision of the tariff has always been a thankless 
task for any party. The failure of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff 
was significant because it was opposed by such a large number o 
prominent party members. The tariff question was a factor in 
the strong insurgency movement in 1909 and 1910 and the remain-
der of Taft's administration was one of discord and dissatis-
f'action. Insurgency as a temporary condition had plagued the 
Republican leaders sorely. There were indications that the 
minds of the people were turning towards the possibility of 
permanent cleavage within the Republican ranks. The adoption 
of the Tariff of 1909 failed to end the agitation for further 
tariff revision. 
The Tariff of 1909 as signed by the Republican President 
William Taft was passed by the Congress in answer to American 
23LaFollette, ~· cit., 104. 
246lst Congress, 455. 
256lst Congress, 456. 
87 
sentiment that it fostered trusts and combinations and that the 
rates of the present tariff were too high and too favorable to 
big business. New industrial conditions and increased produc-
tion in the country could not expand with the present rates of 
duty. The country, as a whole, favored a great reduction of 
the tariff rates in order that protection might guard and de-
velop the growing industries. The business men pleaded for a 
saner adjustment of the rates as they felt hampered by the 
present terms. Undue discriminations against the United States 
by foreign countries led the people to recognize the need for a 
new and lower tariff. The new version to the principle of pro-
tection was hailed in many sections of the country as the defi-
nite answer to the tariff question. This was the doctrine 
which stated that the protection principLe in all legislation 
was best maintained by the imposition of duties as would equal 
the difference between the cost of production at home and 
abroad, with a reasonable profit to American industries. Pro-
tection of the tariff brings revenue to the government and to 
the country and its people in every occupation and calling. It 
develops the resources and increases the wealth of the nation, 
making it independent in every way. Thus the Republican Party 
in 1909 held the commission of the American public to revise 
the tariff downward upon the lines of protection. 
The Congress of the United States entered upon and carried 
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out the revision of the tariff as best they could along the 
lines of the Republican party platform and according to their 
own ideas. An exhaustive investigation was made, the results 
of which went into the compilation of the new tariff provision. 
Sereno E. Payne and Nelson Aldrich of the House and Senate 
respectively, led the debates and the writing of the tariff ac-
cording to the demands of the country and the various commit-
tees in Congress. The tariff schedules were revised downward 
and a few upward as were necessary for protection. Included in 
the new bill were maximum and minimum rates which would in-
crease the tariff on foreign goods from those countries who 
were unduly discriminating against us. The bill authorized a 
new tax on corporations of the United States which was to open 
a new system of revenue for the Treasury. A resolution was 
passed to submit to the States an amendment authorizing the 
government to tax the incomes of the individuals. 
The Tariff of 1909 was, in fact, a measure of unusual sig-
nificance. Politically, it illustrated the changed alignment 
or the parties. Economically, it established conditions which 
will probably be of binding force for some time to come. In-
ternationally, it changed our .commercial dealings with foreign 
countries. The tarif':t' did not change the existing situation 
with regard to the duties. It was a backward step in most 
particulars. It made only slight nominal reductions in the 
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general level of tariff rates, if it made any; and that even 
this reduction was not genuine, since it was far more than 
offset by increases or duty at crucial points where protection 
had been found to be unsatisfactory, while the reductions in-
troduced were for the most part misleading or fictitious. It 
has been said that the tariff was deceptive and false in its 
inception and framing, political and dishonest in its presenta-
tion, discussion, and passage, misleading and double-faced in 
its terms, and clumsy in its application to international con-
ditions.26 It has materially lowered no general range of 
duties but has heightened many. It has redistributed the bur-
den of the tariff taxation so as to make it substantially 
harder to bear. It has failed to meet an important inter-
national situation in any adequate way. From every standpoint 
the bill has proved unsatisfactory and disappointing. It is a 
discredit to the party responsible for it and as great a dis-
credit to the party which failed to offer effective opposition 
to it. 
The Payne-Aldrich tariff was a protectionist measure, 
framed by a protectionist party, in fulfillment of a protec-
tionist platform, and was administered by a protectionist 
government. Neither the high nor the low tariff advocates were 
26H. Parker Willis, "The Tariff of 1909," Journal of Political 
Economy, Volume 18, University of Chicago, Chicago, March, 
1910, 195-196. 
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pleased with it. It was the sort of compromise; an effort to 
please both sides and really did not please either. But it 
was the best and only bill under the circumstances that could 
be obtained, and it was better than the existing law. The re-
vision of an American tariff is a great international event, 
watched closely by the Chancellaries of the world and vitally 
affecting millions of the world's toilers of whose very exist-
ence most of us are dimly aware. The way in which the tariff 
had been dealt with in 1909 strengthened the impression that 
the interests looked in the direction of the Democrats for 
support.27 The Republicans were defeated in the Congressional 
elections of 1910 under these influences. The split in the 
party had a great deal to do with this defeat, yet it was 
questioned that even this defection would cause the Republican 
downfall. The country was dissatisfied with the party and its 
leaders and it continued to show this discontent in the years 
that followed. 
27Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 411-412. 
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